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ABSTRACT 
U.S. critical infrastructure includes those assets that are vital to maintaining the 
nation’s security, economy, and public health and safety.  A reliable supply of electric 
power provides an essential foundation for the daily operation of all national critical 
infrastructure as well as most aspects of modern society.  A sustained loss of electricity 
would be significantly detrimental to the economy and the health and security of the 
nation.  Since 1935, the U.S. electric power industry has been heavily regulated in order 
to address issues such as consumer protection, rate control, conservation, and market 
competition.  However, legislators have not considered the impact of regulations on the 
resiliency of critical infrastructure.  This thesis argues that the energy sector regulatory 
framework has directly resulted in decreased security and reliability of electric power 
infrastructure.  Energy legislation has created a “tragedy of the commons” situation for 
power transmission lines where utilities are reluctant to invest in infrastructure needed to 
ensure the reliable delivery of electricity.  The solution to ensuring the resilience of 
electric power infrastructure is to craft a combination of regulatory improvements, 
reliability standards, and financial incentives to ensure the electric power industry is able 
to provide the foundational structure needed for U.S. national security. 
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I. ENERGY SECTOR REGULATIONS AND ELECTRIC POWER 
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
In recent years the rise in energy prices has been a recurring high interest topic as 
it increasingly impacts many aspects of our daily lives.  As fuel prices have risen, the 
prices of goods and services have correspondingly increased in order for businesses to 
recoup their expenses.  Although not as rapidly as oil and gasoline, the cost of electricity 
has been increasing steadily as well.  The price of electricity increased dramatically in the 
1970s during the oil crisis, but then remained fairly constant from 1982 to 2000, only 
increasing about 1% per year which was well below the level of inflation.  From 2000 to 
2006, though, the price of electricity increased an average of 4.4% per year with a large 
jump of 10% in 2006.1  By comparison, inflation has averaged 2.7% during this same 
time period.2  The price of energy has been drastically impacted by the global political 
and economic environment, but energy prices are also significantly affected by the 
regulatory environment that constrains the energy industry’s decisions about operations 
and investments.  For example, the huge spike in electricity prices in California between 
1999 and 2000 was affected more by the regulatory environment and local market 
manipulation by the energy industry than by the market prices for fuel used to generate 
electricity.3  As the energy sector is scrutinized as a result of ballooning prices, attention 
should also be focused on the infrastructure which is essential to meeting national energy 
needs.  If the infrastructure is not properly maintained and protected from damage, not 
only will energy prices likely spike higher, but the ability to maintain a reliable supply of 
electricity will be at risk of widespread regional or national disruption. 
Both the economy and U.S. national security are dependent on the foundation 
provided by a reliable supply of electricity.  The infrastructure that enables the 
 
1 Electricity price percentages calculated from average retail prices of electricity in Energy 
Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2007 (Washington, DC: 2008), Table 8.10. 
2 Inflation percentage calculated from Consumer Price Index-Urban (CPI-U) Urban in U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, "Consumer Price Index," Washington, DC, August 14, 2008, 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm (accessed August 16, 2008). 
3 Matthew Waldron, "Exploring Failed Electricity Deregulation: Lawyers' Role in Supporting a 
Healthy Marketplace," The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 19, no. 3 (Summer 2006), 1007-8. 
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transmission and distribution of electricity is identified as one of the vital national assets 
that must be protected and preserved.  The National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
describes the importance of protecting electric power and other national critical 
infrastructure assets: 
Protecting the critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) of the 
United States is essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety, 
economic vitality, and way of life.  Attacks on CI/KR could significantly 
disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce 
cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of 
the incident.4 
Modern society is dependent on electricity to turn on the lights, conduct banking 
transactions, run manufacturing facilities, and communicate via the phone or internet.  
Businesses, hospitals, schools, factories, and government facilities are forced to shut 
down when the power goes out.  Because power must be provided for people to work, 
some of the most essential facilities have backup generators to provide electricity during 
a power outage.  Most facilities cannot continue to function, though, beyond a few hours 
without the return of electricity supplied by the power grid.  The focus of the research for 
this paper will be on the need to preserve national security and protect the economy by 
improving the security and reliability of electric power critical infrastructure. 
Improving the operation of electric power infrastructure is a responsibility shared 
by industry and government.  Regulations established by federal and state governments 
significantly affect decisions made by utility companies about investing in power grid 
infrastructure.  The electric power industry has been subject to a number of restrictive 
regulations since the 1930s.  In the 1970s, the government began to shift its oversight of 
the electric industry from strictly regulating the structure of utilities to following more of 
a market-based approach.5  Power outages in recent years demonstrate that the 
government regulatory approach has not been sufficient to ensure adequate reliability and 
security measures are implemented by the power industry to protect and maintain their 
 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, DC: 
2006), 1. 
5 Amy Abel, Electric Reliability: Options for Electric Transmission Infrastructure Improvements 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 1-2, 9. 
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infrastructure assets.  Some power companies have established internal efforts to learn 
from past mistakes and document their lessons learned, and yet still the lessons have been 
ignored and government oversight has failed to ensure consistent reliability for the 
electric power grid.6  The regulatory environment has actually resulted in the opposite 
effect, causing the power grid architecture to be less reliable and secure.  Government 
energy policy has led, for example, to electric utilities limiting their investment in 
transmission line infrastructure. 
Major power failures such as the widespread blackout in August 2003 indicate 
that existing infrastructure is not able to withstand significant outages, whether resulting 
from component failures, natural disasters, or deliberate sabotage.  In an environment of 
significant energy regulations, why are incidents like the August 2003 blackout still able 
to occur?  Why has U.S. energy policy failed to ensure the electric power grid is secure 
and reliable?  This paper argues that energy regulatory policy has weakened the power 
grid by focusing on goals that were intended to address consumer prices and 
environmental conservation without considering the detrimental effects it would have on 
the security of electric power critical infrastructure.  To correct the failures in U.S. energy 
policy, the solution is for Congress to establish strong reliability standards, provide 
regulatory and financial incentives to invest in infrastructure, and foster the use of 
innovative technologies that will create a more resilient electric power grid. 
A. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
The definition of critical infrastructure in Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 7 (HSPD-7) is “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or 
 
6 For example, Con Edison established a seminar titled “Lesson Learned from the 1977 Blackout” that 
was made available to the electric industry and lessons are also documented at the “Blackout History 
Project,” a web-based  site maintained by George Mason University at http://www.blackout.gmu.edu/.  See 
Philip E. Auerswald et al., Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action can Reduce Public 
Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 169. 
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safety, or any combination of those matters.”7  Critical infrastructures are divided into a 
number of sectors, but many of them are interconnected, meaning damage to one asset 
can have far-reaching impacts in other sectors.8  This paper will focus on the energy 
sector, specifically the electric power industry, which is one of the most interconnected 
and foundational sectors that our society depends on for all aspects of daily life.9  Any 
significant failures or shortfalls in the energy sector would severely damage or halt the 
ability of the national economy to function, putting our safety and security at risk until 
the infrastructure was returned to service.  In the interest of preserving national security, 
the country cannot accept the risk of devastating national impacts as a result of cascading 
effects from the destruction of foundational energy infrastructure assets. 
Existing electricity infrastructure analysis emphasizes the inadequacy of market 
incentives to encourage infrastructure investment as well as the effect of regulatory 
reform on limiting investment in electricity infrastructure. The electric power industry 
has been significantly affected by several major Congressional regulatory actions:  the 
Public Utility Act of 1935, which is made up of two components, the Public Utilities 
Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) and the Federal Power Act; the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA); and the Energy Policy Acts of 1992 (EPAct 
1992) and 2005 (EPAct 2005).10  These energy regulations have defined the structure of 
companies in the electric industry as well as the level of investment in power generation 
and transmission infrastructure throughout the U.S.  The regulatory emphasis has shifted 
from strict regulation initiated in 1935 to leveraging market-based dynamics beginning in 
 
7 George W. Bush, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection," Washington, DC, December 17, 2003, citing 42 U.S. Code sec. 5195c(e). 
8 The full list of critical infrastructure/key resource sectors includes: agriculture and food; defense 
industrial base; energy; public health and healthcare; national monuments and icons; banking and finance; 
drinking water and water treatment systems; chemical; commercial facilities; dams; emergency services; 
commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; information technology; telecommunications; postal and 
shipping; transportation systems; and government facilities. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 3. 
9 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Interscience, 2006), 56-57. 
10 Amy Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1998); Abel, 
Electric Reliability: Options for Electric Transmission Infrastructure Improvements. 
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the 1970s.  The regulatory limits placed on the electricity industry, even with a shift to 
some market-based approaches, may be a contributing factor to the current vulnerabilities 
in electricity infrastructure.  While existing analysis addresses the limited effectiveness of 
market-based incentives on improving electric infrastructure security, there appears to be 
a gap in research into whether or not regulations have been a direct contributing factor in 
creating electricity infrastructure vulnerabilities.  The impacts of the regulatory 
environment will be examined along with potential improvements to the market 
environment and opportunities for partnership with industry to improve the reliability and 
security of electric power infrastructure. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan assign responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure to government 
agencies as well as to private industry, agencies and citizens.11  The government and 
private entities responsible for infrastructure security, and the actions taken to protect the 
infrastructure, vary with the type of infrastructure.  Establishing a national perspective on 
the best actions to protect critical infrastructure is complicated by several factors.  Many 
critical infrastructures are interconnected, meaning damage to one asset can have far-
reaching impacts in other sectors of critical infrastructure.  Since most critical 
infrastructure crosses state boundaries, the overall operation of the infrastructure is 
regulated at the federal level.12  As a result, state and local governments and the private 
sector do not have the perspective to adequately assess interstate and national impacts of 
damage to infrastructure assets.  However, approximately 85% of national critical 
infrastructure assets are owned and operated by the private sector.13  While expertise on 
infrastructure vulnerability is primarily in the private sector, the federal government has 
an integrated national view of the highest priority infrastructure sectors and assets as well 
as access to national intelligence assessments which are essential to determining what 
 
11 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 2007), 4; 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2. 
12 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation, 10. 
13 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 4. 
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threats are likely to impact critical infrastructure.  HSPD-7 appropriately assigns the 
responsibility for coordinating the national effort and creating a national plan for critical 
infrastructure protection to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).14  DHS has the necessary perspective to provide direction on critical 
infrastructure protection, unifying the efforts of federal, state, local, and private 
protection efforts.  DHS does not, however, have regulatory authority over the critical 
infrastructure sectors.  While DHS can set strategy and facilitate investment in 
infrastructure security, the department will have to work with Congress and other 
regulatory authorities, such as the Department of Energy (DOE), to address security 
requirements that are impacted by the regulatory environment of the infrastructure 
sectors. 
There are several areas of general agreement on the topic of critical infrastructure 
protection.  Most authors agree that the allocation of resources and efforts for protecting 
critical infrastructure should be based on a prioritization methodology which is 
characterized by some form of a risk-based assessment.15  How the risk assessment is 
done and how well it is currently being implemented is heavily debated, but the general 
principle of needing an objective prioritization criteria is commonly accepted.  The 
magnitude of the protection task is enormous, for example there are 2,800 power plants, 
66,000 chemical plants, 590,000 highway bridges, and 2 million miles of pipelines.16  
There are simply not enough resources available to protect all assets that are classified as 
critical infrastructure, so it is essential to have some method of prioritization.  Since 
approximately 85% of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, 
another area of agreement on the treatment of critical infrastructure is that representatives 
from private industry need to be integrally involved in critical infrastructure protection 
 
14 Bush, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection," par. 12-15, 27. 
15 See for example Todd Masse, Siobhan O'Neil and John Rollins, The Department of Homeland 
Security's Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2007); Henry H. Willis et al., Terrorism Risk Modeling for Intelligence 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007); Lewis, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation. 
16 George W. Bush, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Key Assets (Washington, DC: 2003), 9. 
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planning.17  The owners and operators of these assets know their most important 
components and associated vulnerabilities and they have the knowledge required to 
recommend security measures to protect the critical infrastructure from an attack or 
natural disaster.  Without integrated private sector involvement, any protection planning 
would be woefully inadequate.  Within the energy sector, most authors agree that 
companies have not invested sufficiently in infrastructure capability and security.18  As a 
result of deregulation through the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992) and 
subsequent regulatory changes by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 
competition in the industry has pressured companies to reduce expenditures on their 
infrastructure in order to maintain their competitive position in the market.19  Recent 
legislation included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) has been designed to 
expand the options for electric power companies to finance investments in electricity 
infrastructure.20  Although there are questions about the ability of recent changes to 
sufficiently increase infrastructure investment to meet current and future requirements, 
most authors agree that investment is needed and should be encouraged.  When analysis 
turns to the specific details of how to protect and improve critical infrastructure, though, 
there are disagreements on who is primarily responsible and what the best methods are to 
address the shortfalls. 
A significant debate on critical infrastructure protection revolves around the 
approach to government and private sector roles.  The National Infrastructure Protection 
 
17 See for example Joe D. Whitley, George A. Koenig and Steven E. Roberts, "Homeland Security, 
Law, and Policy through the Lens of Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset Protection," Jurimetrics 47, no. 
3 (Spring 2007), 259-79; Alane Kochems, Who's on First? A Strategy for Protecting Critical Infrastructure 
(Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2005); Arjen Boin and Denis Smith, "Terrorism and Critical 
Infrastructures: Implications for Public-Private Crisis Management," Public Money & Management 26, no. 
5 (November 2006), 295-304. 
18 See for example Joshua P. Fershee, "Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and 
Market Initiatives are Insufficient to Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure," Harvard Journal on 
Legislation 44, no. 2 (Summer 2007), 328-330; Abel, Electric Reliability: Options for Electric 
Transmission Infrastructure Improvements, 5-6; American Society of Civil Engineers, "Report Card for 
America's Infrastructure: Energy," Reston, VA, 2005, 
http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2005/page.cfm?id=25 (accessed June 1, 2008). 
19 Christopher W. Johnson, "Public Policy and the Failure of National Infrastructures," International 
Journal of Emergency Management 4, no. 1 (2007), 26-27. 
20 Abel, Electric Reliability: Options for Electric Transmission Infrastructure Improvements, 2. 
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Plan places the responsibility on the private sector to protect critical infrastructure assets 
that they own and operate.21  The central question is, will the private sector spend the 
resources required to secure critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters?  One side of the debate emphasizes the primary role for the federal government 
is to prevent terrorist attacks, while the private sector is primarily responsible for 
protecting their infrastructure assets.  They argue that the government should facilitate 
critical infrastructure protection by partnering with the private sector and providing 
incentives and voluntary guidelines.22  Some authors in the limited government 
involvement camp argue that market economics provide sufficient incentives to the 
private sector to improve security.  In the energy market, competition is advocated as the 
best method to reduce consumer costs as well as increase industry profits which can then 
provide capital to invest in infrastructure.23  Additionally, authors note that the 
government needs to partner with the private sector because they have the best 
knowledge of vulnerabilities inherent in their infrastructure assets.  On the other side of 
the debate are advocates for direct government involvement through funding or 
regulatory standards for critical infrastructure protection.24  They argue that market 
forces will not provide sufficient motivation to allocate enough resources to adequately 
protect critical infrastructure.  Additionally, in the electricity sector there is concern that 
deregulation has limited access to system operations data for electricity transmission as a 
result of it being classified by companies as competition sensitive information.  Increased 
 
21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 26-27. 
22 For an emphasis on government as facilitator see Auerswald et al., Seeds of Disaster, Roots of 
Response: How Private Action can Reduce Public Vulnerability; Steven Roberts, "Critical Infrastructure 
Protection and Homeland Security," Perspectives on Preparedness, no. 15 (July 2003), 1-12; Kochems, 
Who's on First? A Strategy for Protecting Critical Infrastructure; Mark Sauter and James Jay Carafano, 
Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, Preventing, and Surviving Terrorism (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2005). 
23 See for example Jason Makansi, Lights Out: The Electricity Crisis, the Global Economy, and what 
it Means to You (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007); Robert Peltier, "PUHCA Still Stifling Industry 
Growth," Power 149, no. 5 (June 2005), 4. 
24 For an emphasis on government regulation see Clark Kent Ervin, Open Target: Where America is 
Vulnerable to Attack, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Ted Lewis and Rudy Darken, 
"Potholes and Detours in the Road to Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy," Homeland Security Affairs 
1, no. 2 (Fall 2005), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=1.2.1 (accessed November 4, 2007); Chris Logan, "How 
Willing is Private Industry to Identify its Vulnerabilities and Protect Critical Infrastructure?" In Homeland 
Security, the Reference Shelf, eds. Norris Smith and Lynn Messina, Vol. 76, no. 1 (Bronx, NY: H.W. 
Wilson Company, 2004), 155-59. 
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regulation is argued as necessary to make the data available to determine needed 
infrastructure improvements and expansion requirements.25  The regulation camp also 
argues that only the government has a complete national-level security perspective 
sufficient to prioritize security measures for the most important infrastructure assets. 
There is a tendency in the debate to heavily emphasize one side of the argument 
or the other, with no consideration of a middle ground.  In the government facilitation 
versus regulation debate, some authors have an overly wide focus on deficiencies in 
critical infrastructure security, arguing that emphasis needs to be placed on a 
comprehensive plan to fix almost every identified shortfall.26  That assessment is 
idealistic, requiring significantly increased funding that would need to be supported by a 
significant restructuring of funding allocations in the federal budget.  For example, Clark 
Kent Ervin says in the conclusion of his book, “We should … spare no expense to defend 
our nation here at home, now that we’re under a continuous threat of attack on our own 
soil … Our priorities are misplaced when the budget of the Department of Defense is 
almost exactly ten times larger than that of the Department of Homeland Security.”27  He 
implies that homeland security should be given a blank check, with the funding coming at 
the expense of other national security priorities.  On the other side of the debate are 
advocates for limited regulatory action with a focus on government partnering with the 
private sector to facilitate their efforts in protecting the critical infrastructure assets they 
own and operate.  There is not much analysis focused on a mix of methods, including 
government regulation as well as partnership and incentives, where appropriate, to 
provide a balanced approach to protecting privately owned and operated critical 
infrastructure.  The outcome of the debate over how to improve critical infrastructure 
security would benefit from research into an effective balance of government interactions 
with the private sector. 
 
25 Jack (John) Casazza, "Blackouts: Is the Risk Increasing?" Electrical World 212, no. 4 (April 1998). 
26 See for example Ervin, Open Target: Where America is Vulnerable to Attack; Roberts, "Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security," 1-12. 
27 Ervin, Open Target: Where America is Vulnerable to Attack, 226. 
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C. OPTIONS TO IMPROVE INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND 
RESILIENCY 
The government has a number of potential avenues available to facilitate 
improvements in the security of electric power infrastructure.  One area to address is the 
impact of regulations on industry’s level of investment in critical infrastructure.  The 
regulatory environment has evolved over time to address governmental concerns without 
necessarily considering the implications on infrastructure security or resiliency.  Many 
regulations that impact critical infrastructure were passed to address issues such as 
conservation, the environment, price stability, and shared access to infrastructure.28  
Security has generally not been a significant factor in many infrastructure policy 
decisions.  As the impacts are assessed now, though, the implications can be seen that 
some regulations favor less resilient designs such as ones that use shared common 
infrastructure assets rather than parallel or redundant architectures.  The recent EPAct 
2005 legislation has reduced some barriers to investment in electric power infrastructure, 
but while some restrictions have been reduced at the federal level, investment approval 
has instead shifted to the states.  The legislation also does not appear to have significantly 
increased incentives for private industry to improve infrastructure security.29  This paper 
will examine options for changing regulations to potentially create incentives for 
innovative approaches to improving electricity infrastructure security. 
Another method the government can use to improve infrastructure security is to 
provide more direct incentives rather than relying primarily on a market-based approach.  
In the thirty years from 1975 through 2005, the demand for electricity has doubled but 
annual investment in infrastructure has decreased.  While demand is expected to continue 
to increase steadily, infrastructure is currently not adequate to meet peak requirements.30  
While assessing the reliability of electric power infrastructure leading up to the summer 
of 2008, the president of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
 
28 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation, 
253-55. 
29 Fershee, "Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market Initiatives are 
Insufficient to Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure," 338-39. 
30 Ibid., 328-29. 
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noted some progress in the previous year, but also commented that “increasing demand 
and limited infrastructure improvements over the long term are still very much a 
concern.”31  Companies in the energy sector apparently do not consider returns on 
investments from improving infrastructure security to be sufficient to justify the costs.  
When companies consider the potential impacts of large infrastructure damage or loss, 
they have alternative recovery options through insurance claims or bankruptcy laws if 
their operational capability is reduced or destroyed.  On a national scale, however, the 
loss of energy infrastructure could have a devastating impact depending on the duration 
of the outage.  Due to the importance of energy critical infrastructure to national security, 
the government could investigate providing industry with more direct incentives to invest 
in security.  This paper will assess potential incentive options the government could use, 
such as tax breaks, cost sharing, grants, or more indirect methods such as establishing 
benchmark requirements to receive reduce rates for risk insurance for terrorist attacks or 
natural disasters. 
A third government approach could be to work with standard setting 
organizations, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), to 
improve the resiliency of the electric power grid.  Electric infrastructure security can be 
improved, for example, by encouraging the use of parallel transmission and distributed 
generation and storage capability.32  Uniform standards do not currently exist for 
connecting to the power grid.33  For companies to develop additional or improved 
infrastructure capability, they need to be able to interface with the existing infrastructure.  
Uniform standards for components and interconnections could facilitate the development 
of new technologies or expand the use of existing capabilities to meet customer’s demand 
for electricity in a more robust manner.  This paper will investigate areas where the 
 
31 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "Electricity Projected to be Reliable Throughout 
North America in Coming Summer, with Limited Concerns," Princeton, NJ, May 14, 2008, 
ftp://ftp.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/docs/pressrel/summer-assessment-pr-FINAL.pdf (accessed June 6, 
2008). 
32 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation, 
283. 
33 Jessica Morrison and Diane Broad, "Wind Interconnection: Bridging the Divide," Electric Light and 
Power 84, no. 3 (May/June 2006), 32-33. 
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government can facilitate setting standards that will enable potential enhancements to 
electric power infrastructure security. 
D. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
First this paper will assess the status of energy infrastructure security and the 
current government approach to dealing with the energy sector.  Recent reforms will be 
addressed in the context of the overall regulatory environment for energy infrastructure.  
Then the paper will examine the benefits of each of three alternatives to improving 
infrastructure security and the challenges that could be faced in implementing them.  The 
alternatives include modifying regulations to create incentives for innovative approaches 
to infrastructure security, providing direct incentives instead of relying on a market-based 
approach, and setting standards to facilitate a more resilient electric power grid.  Finally, 
the research will conclude with an assessment of the political and practical challenges 
inherent in implementing these changes. 
The government has available a number of approaches that can more effectively 
improve energy infrastructure security.  Analysis of the tradeoffs for these approaches 
will be compared with the current strategy for protecting critical infrastructure.  Some of 
the approaches may require significant effort to overcome political opposition, but the 
assessment of potential benefits will demonstrate that some of the alternate strategies 
should be pursued to better protect energy infrastructure.  By weighing the benefits and 
costs of alternative policy options, this paper will provide a framework to assess the 
range of choices available to improve the reliability of electric power infrastructure. 
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II. ENERGY SECTOR REGULATORY REFORMS 
A. INITIAL ADOPTION OF ELECTRICITY 
The U.S. electricity market owes much of its early structure to Thomas Edison 
who in 1879 invented a light bulb that could compete with gas lamps.  To light those 
bulbs, he had to create an entire supporting infrastructure, including generators, 
distribution lines, sockets to hold the bulbs, and switches to turn them on and off.34  The 
structure he created became the basis for the concept of electric power utilities being 
considered a natural monopoly, including within one corporate entity all of the 
components required to create, distribute, and make practical use of electricity.35  In 
1881, Edison hired Samuel Insull to help him run the business he was in the process of 
creating.36  As it turned out, Insull took Edison’s inventions and early forays into the 
electric utility business and made a much broader application, establishing a business that 
prior to its collapse in 1929 with the onset of the Great Depression was the largest 
provider of electricity in the country.37 
For a number of decades, Insull worked with state and local governments to create 
an environment that was very friendly to his vision for providing electricity to as many 
customers as possible.  His quest for reaching more customers led him to break with 
Edison’s preference for direct current (DC) electricity that was limited in the distance that 
it can be transmitted efficiently.  Insull was quick to adopt George Westinghouse’s use of 
alternating current (AC) motors and transformers, which enabled the transmission of 
electricity over long distances.  Using a series of holding companies that owned a number 
of electric utility companies as well as tiers of holding companies that owned other 
holding companies, Insull was able to expand his broad control of the electricity market 
 
34 Gordon L. Weil, Blackout: How the Electric Industry Exploits America (New York: Nation Books, 
2006), 2-3. 
35 Energy Information Administration, The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: 
An Update (Washington, DC: 2000), 5. 
36 Weil, Blackout: How the Electric Industry Exploits America, 5. 
37 Ibid., 17-18. 
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into thirteen states while avoiding federal monopoly legislation.  His close relationship 
with state and local governments, combined with the confusing array of tiered holding 
companies, prevented his companies that controlled much of the electricity industry from 
being regulated at the federal level.38  However, his practices began to draw concern 
from several important national politicians who ultimately dismantled the empire Insull 
had created.  With the passage of the Federal Utility Act of 1935, the ability to own 
electric utilities in multiple states was eliminated and regulations were applied to the 
transmission of electricity across state lines.39 
The success of Insull, and others who ran utility holding companies in the early 
1900s, led to the widespread use of electricity across the United States, but his greed led 
to the breakup of his empire and the federal regulation he had worked hard to avoid.  In 
the process, Insull’s reputation was destroyed as well and he narrowly escaped ending up 
in jail, to the chagrin of many investors whose equity had evaporated.  Insull’s tiered 
holding companies had applied tactics, which unfortunately were repeated in similar 
fashion by Enron a number of decades later, that used investments in other industries to 
hide the true financial condition of the companies.  When the Great Depression cut back 
electricity usage nationwide, the debt that was financing Insull’s holding companies came 
due and they couldn’t pay off their creditors.40  The change in law that regulated the 
industry followed a few years later in 1935 under the leadership of Congressman Sam 
Rayburn (Democrat-Texas) and Senator Burton Wheeler (Democrat-Montana), with the 
strong endorsement and ultimately the signature of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.41 
B. ELECTRICITY MEETS REGULATION 
The Public Utility Act of 1935, which included the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act (PUHCA) and the Federal Power Act, established a regulatory 
 
38 Weil, Blackout: How the Electric Industry Exploits America, 9-12. 
39 Ibid., 26-30. 
40 Ibid., 18-22. 
41 Energy Information Administration, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992 
(Washington, DC: 1993), 8. 
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environment that persisted until the energy crisis of the 1970s.42  A series of legislation 
impacting the energy sector followed the collapse of Insull’s and other utility holding 
companies, to include laws establishing the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933 and the 
Bonneville Power Administration in 1935.  These government-run electric power 
agencies, along with several others that were established to serve regions in the mid-west, 
extended the reach of the electric industry to rural areas that investor-owned companies 
such as Insull’s did not consider profitable enough to justify providing electric service.  
The Rural Electrification Administration was established in 1935 as well to oversee the 
extension of electricity’s reach to rural areas.43  Congress and the President wanted to 
prevent another utility holding company monopoly as well as to ensure electricity was 
available to everyone in the nation, not just urban areas with large numbers of customers. 
The Public Utility Act of 1935 was aimed in large part at the damage that had 
been done by large utility holding companies through underhanded corporate dealings 
that hid the true nature of their financial transactions from customers, investors, and 
public officials.44  The similarities to the type of hidden transactions made by Enron, to 
prevent public knowledge of the corporation’s financial condition, are striking.  It is 
unfortunate that lessons learned in the 1930s had to be relearned at the turn of the 21st 
century.45  In spite of thousands of pages of regulations established by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that address the operations of the electricity 
industry, Enron demonstrated it is difficult to prevent willful, deliberate fraud, especially 
when there is collusion with other companies, in the case of Enron with their financial 
auditors, to provide cover for criminal behavior.46  Once it was implemented, PUHCA 
did improve protections for consumers and investors by significantly limiting the 
likelihood of utility holding companies putting large regions of the country at risk.  By 
 
42 Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 2. 
43 Weil, Blackout: How the Electric Industry Exploits America, 28-29. 
44 Energy Information Administration, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992, 1-9. 
45 Amy Abel and Larry Parker, Electricity: The Road Toward Restructuring (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2004), 9-10. 




                                                
breaking up the large holding companies, the legislation made it a much simpler task to 
oversee the more limited scope of u
The primary provision established through PUHCA was the regulation by the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) of interstate operations conducted by the gas 
and electric industries.  The SEC was charged with requiring large holding companies to 
sell off assets in order to reduce their span of operations to a limited geographic region.  
As a result, many of the utility holding companies were reduced to operating within a 
single state and were therefore regulated at the state level.47  For utility holding 
companies that continued to operate across state lines, they were required to provide 
information about their operations to the SEC and to receive approval for their more 
important financial transactions.  The companies were required to maintain accounting 
records that were to be available for review by the SEC.  They were required to obtain 
authorization from the SEC before raising capital through securities.  They were also 
prohibited from levying high management fees on their utility companies, which resulted 
in electricity rate increases, and from taking loans from their utility companies, which 
had been used by holding companies like Insull’s to hide their true financial status.  
Holding companies were also limited to controlling only one integrated utility.  Their 
organizational structure was limited to no more than two separate corporate tiers and their 
utility assets were required to be located in areas that were geographically connected.48  
The end result was a significant drop in the number of interstate holding companies and a 
more limited scope of operations for those that remained.  The number of holding 
companies had peaked in the thousands in the 1920s, with the top three controlling 
almost half of the electricity market.  But by the 1990s, a total of about 160 holding 
companies existed, with only a dozen subject to SEC regulation and these interstate 
holding companies only served about 18% of the market.49 
 
47 Energy Information Administration, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992, 9. 
48 Amy Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
(PUHCA) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1999); Energy Information Administration, 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992, 10-11. 




                                                
C. ADJUSTING UTILITY REGULATIONS – ADDRESSING THE ENERGY 
CRISIS 
Regulation of the electric power industry was gradually expanded during the 
decades after PUHCA was implemented, but the next major legislation was not 
implemented until more than forty years later when world events drove Congress to pass 
another significant change to utility industry operations.  The energy crisis which began 
in October 1973 as a result of the OPEC oil embargo shocked the U.S. into a realization 
of how dependent it had become on foreign oil and the electricity that it fueled.50  As 
electricity technology had improved, generation efficiency increased, national coverage 
expanded, and electricity prices dropped.  Utility companies had enjoyed a long period of 
expansion and profitability following World War II.  People had come to rely on 
electricity’s widespread availability and low cost.51  The shortage of oil, though, drove 
up costs for electricity generation and many states began to allow “fuel adjustment 
clauses” to allow utility companies to recover their increased costs from rising
2 
President Jimmy Carter was highly focused on conservation as a result of the 
energy crisis and he supported the efforts of the Democratic Congress to reduce U.S. 
dependence on external energy sources.  Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978 which required electric utilities to buy electricity from 
other generating companies called Qualifying Facilities (QFs).  These QFs included 
“small power producers” that used renewable energy sources and “cogenerators” that 
used steam in their industrial processes as well as to produce electricity.  PURPA had 
effectively ended the expectation that utilities were natural monopolies that needed to 
control all aspects of electricity generation, transmission, distribution, metering, and 
billing.53  PURPA was part of the National Energy Act of 1978 which included other 
 
50 Weil, Blackout: How the Electric Industry Exploits America, 37-38. 
51 Energy Information Administration, The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: 
An Update, 113-14. 
52 Weil, Blackout: How the Electric Industry Exploits America, 38. 
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conservation-minded legislation as well, including the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel 
Use Act that prevented utilities from building new natural gas and oil-fueled generators, 
although QFs were exempted, and the National Energy Conservation Policy Act, 
ed utility companies help their customers in an effort to conserve energy.54 
To facilitate the competitive capability of the new electricity generation facilities, 
PURPA allowed QFs to be exempt from the regulatory requirements of PUHCA.  
Especially for cogenerators, it was essential to allow an exemption from the PUHCA 
restriction on utilities investing in other sectors, since the cogenerators’ core business was 
in the industrial sector, with electricity generation possible from what was previously a 
wasted byproduct.55  PURPA made a significant change in the landscape for electric 
utilities, opening the door for smaller companies to enter the generation market and for 
industrial plants to sell power that was created from steam generated in their 
manufacturing operations.  As a result of PURPA, QFs expanded to provide a significant 
amount of electricity generation, cementing their role in the electricity sector.  In the 
1980s, QFs added generation capability that supplied over 20,000 megawatts according 
to the Department of Energy (DOE), which accounted for roughl
ion capacity added from all sources in that time period.56 
PURPA established the pricing method which allowed Qualifying Facilities to 
determine the profitability of building additional generating capacity.  Utilities were 
required to pay QFs for electricity according to a rate equivalent to what it would have 
cost them to produce the electricity directly, called the “avoided cost.”  The calculation 
did not take into account the expense incurred by QFs to produce the electricity, only the 
calculated cost that the electric utility company would have incurred to generate it.  In 
some regions of the country, avoided costs calculated by state regulators were higher than 
 
54 Energy Information Administration, The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: 
An Update, 35. 
55 Energy Information Administration, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992, 31-
32. 
56 Generation capacity percentage for 1980s calculated from Energy Information Agency table for 
capacity added from 1979-1989, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2007, Table 
8.11a; Energy Information Administration, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992, 32. 
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needed.57  California and New England were focused on improving conservation and 
ended up setting avoided costs too high, while in Southern regions where electricity costs 
were already low, states set avoided costs low, which prevented sufficient profit margin 
to justify building QFs in those regions. 58  After seeing the impacts of PURPA and QFs 
on the utility industry, in the mid-1980s some regions began to adjust their approach to 
setting avoided costs.  Starting in Maine and later spreading throughout the country, 
states changed to a market-driven approach that allows QFs to bid for the price at which 
they would be willing to sell electricity to utilities, rather than having the states establish 
the rates directly.59  The bidding process shifted the basis for the cost of electricity closer 
to the QFs’ actual generation costs.  The change marked a move in the direction of 
establishing a true market for purchasing electricity, which was furthered by another 
change in legislation in the early 1990s.60 
D. MARKET APPROACH ATTEMPTED WITH UTILITIES 
The breakup of the long-held structure of natural monopolies, through the 
introduction of Qualifying Facilities, was found to be a successful model and the utilities 
were interested in benefitting from the regulatory flexibility provided to QFs.61  
Electricity’s cost to consumers continued to decline as technology improved and the 
power industry was interested in expanding their investment options.  The benefits of 
exempting QFs from PUHCA requirements through PURPA, which was designed to 
promote energy conservation after the oil crisis, were seen as a starting point for further 
expansion of a market-based approach to the sale of electricity.  Utilities began to call for 
access to the same flexibility available to QFs, to be able to invest in electricity 
generation without the restrictions of PUHCA, with the objective of further increasing the 
 
57 Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 3. 
58 Weil, Blackout: How the Electric Industry Exploits America, 44-45. 
59 Energy Information Administration, The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: 
An Update, 32. 
60 Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 3-4. 
61 Ibid., 2-4. 
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benefits of competition seen under PURPA.  Some companies were interested in 
investing in electricity generation, but those companies that were not yet subject to 
PUHCA were reluctant to risk having their non-utility business impacted.62  
Additionally, a number of electric utility companies were upset that states’ regulations 
hindered them from profitably investing in new generation capacity, while QFs were able 
to avoid regulatory burdens and more easily take advantage of improved, more efficient 
generation technology.  The Department of Energy became convinced as well that 
competition would further the goals of conservation and reducing consumers’ electricity 
rates.63 
Senator J. Bennett Johnston (Democrat-Louisiana), the chairman of the 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, became an advocate of improving the 
operation of the electricity industry by expanding exceptions to PUHCA.  In 1989 he 
introduced a bill that defined a new category of generation capability called Exempt 
Wholesale Generators (EWGs), which were so named because the generating facilities 
would be exempt from the restrictive requirements of PUHCA.  EWGs were defined as 
electricity generating facilities that were solely in the business of selling electricity in 
wholesale transactions to utilities, not to individual consumers.64  By removing the 
regulatory requirements, EWGs could be owned by companies that were invested in other 
industries without conflicting with the PUHCA requirements.  Utility holding companies 
whose primary business was regulated by PUHCA were also permitted to own EWGs, 
with those specific facilities’ operations being exempt from PUHCA.65  The ideas 
introduced by Senator Johnston were debated and adjusted for three years, but finally 
becoming law when the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) was signed in 1992 by President 
George H. W. Bush. 
 
62 Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 4. 
63 Energy Information Administration, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992, 32-
33. 
64 Ibid., 33-34. 
65 Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 5. 
 21
                                                
President Bush’s administration advocated several changes to Senator Johnston’s 
bill that provided additional protections for consumers from utilities attempting to limit 
competition.  The additional provisions ensured oversight of electricity market 
transactions would be provided at the federal and state level.66  Protections were also 
provided to ensure EWGs had equal access to transmission lines owned by utilities, 
regardless of who owned the generating facilities.67  Utilities were required to divide 
their generation and transmission portions of their business so the prices set for all EWGs 
to use the transmission lines would be fair.  These changes to the generation and 
transmission of electricity were designed to increase competition and reduce electricity 
rates for consumers.  The legislation was not, however, received well by the utility 
companies.  When the regulations to enforce EPAct 1992 were implemented by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) through Order 888, which was 
numbered 888 to match the Washington, DC street address of the commission, industry 
fought its implementation in the courts for a number of years until the Supreme Court 
ruled in 2000 that FERC was appropriately implementing the law.68 
While EPAct 1992 was designed to improve competition and reduce the cost of 
electricity, the implementation of FERC Order 888 actually drove electricity prices up 
when it was implemented in 2000.  Electricity prices had declined for much of the 1990s, 
but the price spiked in 2001 by 4.1% over the price in 2000, going up 1.3% more than the 
increase in the inflation index.  The price of electricity dropped the following year, but 
then increased steadily for the next few years along with the increasing price of oil (see 
Figure 1).69  The jump in electricity prices in 2001 was partially corrected in 2002, 
indicating it may have been a short-term industry adjustment to the new regulations as a 
result of uncertainty about the impacts of the rules changes, rather than a sustained 
 
66 Energy Information Administration, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992, 57. 
67 Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 5. 
68 Weil, Blackout: How the Electric Industry Exploits America, 57; Eric J. Lerner, "What's Wrong 
with the Electric Grid?" The Industrial Physicist 9, no. 5 (October/November 2003), 10. 
69 Electricity prices calculated from Table 8.10, “Average Retail Prices of Electricity, 1960-2007,” in 
Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2007, Table 8.10; Inflation calculated from 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Consumer Price Index." 
inefficiency in the market.  The continuing increase in the price of electricity after 2002 
could be related to the increase in the price of oil more so than the effects from EPAct 
1992.  A longer term trend will need to be established before the effects of the legislation 










































































Figure 1.   Price of Electricity, 1990-2005. 
 
An area of potentially higher concern than the relatively small spikes in the price 
of electricity is the level of utilities’ investment in transmission capacity.  The electric 
grid was designed over the years to support the natural monopoly structure of the electric 
power sector.  Transmission lines were designed to carry power generated in facilities 
designed by the same company.  With the addition of Qualifying Facilities, there was 
only a slight increase in the amount of power that was carried by transmission lines.  
There was a significant change in transmission requirements, though, under EPAct 1992 
with an expansion of the range of companies that could build Exempt Wholesale 
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Generators and the opening of utilities’ transmission lines to carry EWG power without 
discriminating against any of the generating facilities.70 
The transfer of power under the new scheme has been compared to the way 
commodities are handled in the stock market.  Power is bought and sold in a competitive 
market and then transferred to the purchaser across the existing transmission lines, a 
transaction which is referred to as wheeling.  The concern with the commodity analogy is 
that the electric grid was not designed to support long-distance transfers of power that 
take place with wheeling.  The physics do not support a change in the use of the grid and 
as a result wheeling places tremendous stress on the transmission infrastructure.  An 
indication of the level of stress on the grid can be found in the frequency of Transmission 
Loading Relief (TLR) procedures which restrict the use of transmission lines when they 
are overly congested.  Within two months of the Supreme Court ruling approving FERC 
Order 888, TLRs had spiked to a level six times the number in the previous year.71  The 
number of required TLRs has continued to increase since 2000 and may very well get 
much worse as a result of an anticipated ten-year growth rate of 20% in generation 
demand as compared to a projected growth rate of 6% in the miles of transmission line 
infrastructure.  While investment in infrastructure has begun to trend upward since 1999, 
with an annual investment increase in real 2003 dollars of 12%, it follows on the tails of a 
declining level of transmission investment from 1975 through 1998.  The recent increase 
in transmission lines is a positive step, but the decades of investment below the level of 
growth in demand has resulted in a number of areas in the country with problematic 
congestion on the transmission lines.72 
E. A SECOND ENERGY POLICY ACT 
Shortfalls in the electricity sector have become evident, with congestion on a 
number of transmission lines and the major regional blackout experienced in August 
 
70 Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 4-5. 
71 Lerner, "What's Wrong with the Electric Grid?" 10-11. 
72 Abel, Electric Reliability: Options for Electric Transmission Infrastructure Improvements, 5-6. 
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2003 in the Midwest and Northeastern U.S. and Ontario, Canada.  Another round of 
legislation was assembled to address some of the shortfalls identified in the existing 
regulations controlling the operations of the electric power grid.  Similar to the rationale 
behind the passage of PURPA following the OPEC oil embargo, the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 (EPAct 2005) was driven in large part by runaway increases in oil prices and the 
detrimental impact of increasing energy costs on the U.S. economy.73  The energy bill 
was sponsored by Senator Pete Domenici (Republican-New Mexico) and Congressman 
Joe Barton (Republican-Texas) and received bipartisan support in both houses of 
Congress, gaining yes votes from roughly 3/4 of the Senate and 2/3 of the House, before 
being signed by President George W. Bush in August 2005.74 
The 2005 legislation makes a number of significant changes to the energy 
regulatory environment.  Some limitations in the law’s ability to sustain U.S. energy 
security were highlighted, though, when Hurricane Katrina caused a significant reduction 
in domestic oil production and refining capacity as a result of storm damage a few weeks 
after the bill was signed into law.75  In spite of unfortunate timing that negatively 
affected assessments of EPAct 2005, it did significantly alter the electricity sector 
landscape, addressing competition, reliability, and infrastructure investment.  One of the 
most significant changes was the full repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
of 1935.  In place of PUHCA, EPAct 2005 does sustain the SEC’s role in approving 
mergers proposed for utility holding companies and any investments made outside of the 
utility industry.  The shift in the law allows flexibility in the investment portfolio of 
utility companies as long as the decisions are approved by the SEC.  Some additional 
requirements from PURPA, which had mandated that utilities purchase electricity from 
QFs, were also repealed by EPAct 2005.76 
 
73 Mark Holt and Carol Glover, Energy Policy Act of 2005: Summary and Analysis of Enacted 
Provisions (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 1. 
74 Bill sponsors and status available from The Library of Congress, "H.R. 6: Energy Policy Act of 
2005," Washington, DC, 2005, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:6:./temp/~c109CEMDue:: 
(accessed September 9, 2008). 
75 Holt and Glover, Energy Policy Act of 2005: Summary and Analysis of Enacted Provisions, 1. 
76 Ibid., 2. 
 25
                                                
To address the reliability of the electric grid, EPAct 2005 gave FERC the 
authority to establish an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) with the responsibility 
to establish obligatory reliability standards.  The reliability of transmission lines is to be 
addressed by DOE through a study conducted every three years that addresses the 
congestion of transmission lines.  Regions that are determined to be congested can in 
some cases be approved for construction of new transmission infrastructure through the 
direct granting of building permits from FERC as well as the potential to have eminent 
domain granted through U.S. District Court.77  These direct effects on the electricity 
industry are also supplemented by regulations affecting the larger energy sector, to 
include tax incentives, conservation guidelines, and renewable fuel goals.78 
The impact of federal legislation which set the regulatory environment for the 
electric power sector has created a number of opportunities for improvements in the 
operations of the power grid and the security of its infrastructure.  With states also 
playing a regulatory role, there is a fair amount of ambiguity in the path the electricity 
sector will take in the next few years.79  The goals for strategically developing the 
electric power sector need to continue to be refined to build a clear path toward a more 
resilient infrastructure that is less reliant on foreign sources of fuel and less susceptible to 
disruptions from attacks or natural disasters. 
 
77 Holt and Glover, Energy Policy Act of 2005: Summary and Analysis of Enacted Provisions, 1-2. 
78 Ibid., 2-5. 
79 Amy Abel, Electric Transmission: Approaches for Energizing a Sagging Industry (Washington, 
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III. IMPROVING ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
SECURITY – LEGISLATIVE MEASURES 
The regulations, guidelines, standards, and requirements that impact the electric 
power industry are rather extensive.  EPAct 2005 repealed PUHCA, which controlled the 
structure of utility companies for seventy years, but at the same time it added 550 pages 
of new regulatory guidance.80  Wading through the legislation in EPAct 2005 took a 
nineteen-person Congressional Research Service staff 152 pages to summarize the main 
provisions.81  Even with the extensive length of the recent energy legislation, there are 
still a number of uncertainties that remain in the electric power industry about 
congressional intensions for the electricity market environment, the level of infrastructure 
investment, and the areas that will receive further regulatory action.82  Several provisions 
in EPAct 2005 should work well to improve the reliability of the electric power grid, but 
there is also room for improvement in the regulatory framework that affects the electric 
power industry.  For example, Congress could provide clarification about their intension 
for the division of responsibilities in the overlapping roles of state and federal regulatory 
agencies in the siting of transmission line infrastructure.  Congress will need to resolve 
some of the areas where there is a lack of clarity and where shortfalls have been 
discovered in existing energy legislation in order to guide federal, state, and electric 
power industry actions to create a more resilient electric power grid. 
A. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION (ERO) 
Over the years the focus of energy regulation has been on the organizational 
structure of the industry and the rates that customers are required to pay.  EPAct 2005 
began to shift some of the focus to improving the reliability of the power grid.  The 
legislation addressed a number of other areas as well, such as expanding the diversity in 
fuels used for generation, improving generation efficiency, reducing electricity retail 
 
80 Energy Policy Act of 2005, U.S. Statutes at Large 119 (2005): 594-1143. 
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rates, and providing tax breaks that focused on reducing U.S. dependence on foreign 
energy.83  The congressional focus after the August 14, 2003 blackout, though, was on 
legislating the implementation of mandatory reliability guidelines that had previously 
been left to industry to handle independently.84  Some regions in the U.S. had already 
been successful in establishing reliability guidelines that resulted in fairly robust regional 
grid architectures, but the integrated nature of the electric power grid means that a weak 
link in one area can rapidly affect many other areas of the grid as well.  The 2003 
blackout began with only a few generation and transmission line outages in Ohio, but 
once the localized troubles in Ohio reached a critical level, outages cascaded through the 
power grid infrastructure blacking out the Midwest and Northeastern U.S. and Ontario, 
Canada.85  The mistakes made by one utility company in Ohio, FirstEnergy, were a result 
of shortcuts that had been taken to reduce operating expenses and improve profit margins.  
These actions ran counter to the lessons learned from previous blackouts and to the 
voluntary reliability guidelines established by NERC.  FirstEnergy failed to trim trees 
along transmission lines, train their operators on emergency procedures, and maintain 
reliable system monitoring capability to allow operators to identify grid problems as they 
occurred.86  The failure of voluntary reliability guidelines to prevent the root causes of 
the 2003 blackout resulted in a renewed interest in making reliability measures 
mandatory in order to improve the overall security of the power grid. 
The reliability legislation in EPAct 2005 provided a good start toward necessary 
reform that emphasizes the importance of U.S. electric power critical infrastructure.  
EPAct 2005 did not establish specific reliability standards, nor did it require a federal 
agency to write standards, but instead it provided FERC with the authority to designate 
an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) which would have the expertise needed to 
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make the grid more reliable.  The ERO was intended to implement reliability standards 
with FERC’s approval.  Once the standards were approved by FERC, Congress provided 
the ERO with the authority to enforce the standards and impose penalties on utilities that 
do not follow them.87  The legislation gave sufficient authority to the ERO to make the 
standards meaningful.  In the 2003 blackout, the problems that led to the cascading power 
outage were not a result of a lack of knowledge about what steps were required to 
maintain a reliable power grid.  Rather the shortfalls were due to a clear disregard for 
reliability guidelines and lessons learned from previous blackouts.88  A number of the 
contributing factors to the blackout were apparently due to an interest in saving money to 
boost company profits.  At the time of the blackout in 2003, the industry reliability 
guidelines were published by NERC which was a voluntary industry organization guided 
by the interests of member utilities.89  The most recent major federal energy regulation in 
EPAct 1992 was focused in part on building a competitive market in the electric utility 
industry, not on the reliability of the power grid.90  In its analysis of the reasons for the 
2003 blackout, the joint U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force’s first 
recommendation was to “make reliability standards mandatory and enforceable, with 
penalties for non-compliance.”91  EPAct 2005 provided the framework needed to 
implement this task force recommendation. 
After EPAct 2005 was signed into law, it took almost a year for FERC to 
designate the ERO that would be responsible for establishing electricity industry 
reliability standards.   Providing continuity in the role that NERC had played in 
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establishing voluntary reliability guidelines, FERC designated NERC92 as the U.S. 
Electric Reliability Organization on July 20, 2006.93  Another eight months passed before 
FERC approved 83 reliability standards out of 107 that had been proposed by NERC.  
While FERC noted that “many of the reliability standards ‘need significant 
improvement,’” at least there was finally an initial set of reliability standards in place that 
had FERC’s backing and carried the threat of penalties for non-compliance.94 
The NERC reliability standards cover a number of aspects of the operation of the 
electric power grid, including load balancing, infrastructure protection, emergency 
preparedness, training, and communications.95  The recommendations made by the U.S.-
Canada Power System Outage Task Force in April 2004 were finally beginning to be 
implemented, although it had been almost three years since they had been proposed.96  
Now it is up to FERC and NERC to ensure that adequate funding and personnel are 
devoted to the effort required to evaluate utilities for compliance against the reliability 
standards and to impose appropriate penalties when violations occur.  NERC will also 
need to refine and improve the reliability standards to ensure they are not ambiguous and 
that utilities are able to interpret and implement them consistently.  One of the critiques 
about the NERC voluntary reliability guidelines at the time of the August 2003 blackout 
was that they were vague, leaving considerable room for differing interpretations.97  In 
 
92 The North American Electric Reliability Council was renamed the North American Electric 
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approving the new mandatory standards, FERC noted that a significant amount of effort 
was still required and the commission held back a number of the proposed standards for 
later approval, requesting NERC provide additional details.98  As the standards are 
reviewed and improved, individual examples of utility operations around the U.S. should 
be examined to ensure the lessons learned, from previous blackouts and more than a 
century of electricity industry operations, are applied appropriately to improve the 
reliability of the electric power grid.  It will be important for NERC to ensure utility 
companies throughout the country are consistently implementing the standards in their 
internal operations.  In addition to documentation of the standards, NERC should 
implement training to be conducted by industry reliability experts in order to facilitate an 
equal understanding of best practices across the various electric power regions.  While 
additional infrastructure will need to be built in a number of congested regions to ensure 
continued reliable operations, the consistent application of appropriate reliability 
standards with existing infrastructure will certainly help to prevent major outages like the 
regional blackout in 2003. 
B. INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION AND GOVERNMENT EXPERTISE 
Reliance on industry representative organizations, such as NERC, to enforce 
reliability standards has a number of advantages since the members have access to 
internal technical expertise on the operational details of the electric power system.  As the 
Electric Reliability Organization, NERC is a “self-regulatory” institution that has the 
authority from FERC to establish rules and standards with input from industry experts.99  
Due to the breadth of expertise available in its designated role as the ERO, NERC has the 
potential to significantly improve the resilience of the electric power grid.  However, 
there will always be some reluctance for industry representatives to voluntarily set 
stringent standards that are important from a reliability perspective, but are costly and do 
not improve the profitability of the utilities’ operations.  Self-regulated governance can 
work well in a market environment where true competition forces the industry to meet 
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standards to improve their chances at gaining market share.  But in the utility industry, 
the significant expense involved in constructing transmission and generation assets and 
the technical knowledge required to operate the power grid set formidable barriers to the 
formation of a truly competitive environment.  The establishment of Qualifying Facilities 
(QFs) and Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWGs) has introduced some competition to 
the electricity industry, but the impact on the overall electricity market has been limited.  
EPAct 2005 further reduced competition potential by allowing utilities to expand their 
ownership into those generation areas through the repeal of PUHCA and modifications to 
PURPA.  With SEC approval, utilities can expand their generation and transmission 
infrastructure holdings beyond the boundaries of a single state without being subject any 
longer to the highly restrictive regulations from PUHCA.  Utilities are also not required 
to purchase power from QFs at avoided cost rates that had been set arbitrarily high in a 
number of regions.  There is a general expectation that the repeal of PUHCA will lead to 
further consolidation of utility asset ownership throughout the industry.100 
The electricity market is already dominated by large corporations that have been 
able to consolidate their holdings and expand the breadth of their control under legislative 
changes, starting with EPAct 1992, that deregulated portions of the industry and pushed it 
toward a market approach.101  Although the electric power industry is no longer 
considered to be made up of “natural monopolies,” the defining characteristics of natural 
monopolies still mostly apply as a result of the high costs and technical expertise required 
to operate the power grid and its components.102  Congressional efforts have so far failed 
to establish true competition in the electricity retail market.  The initial widespread 
enthusiasm about the electricity markets started by Enron and other power marketers 
came crashing down in 2001 when it was revealed that much of the market was a sham, 
with power marketers creating the perception of competition by lying to customers, 
hedging bets on future rate changes, and falsifying records to maintain an appearance of 
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profitable operations.103  Enron and other power marketers were able to fool state and 
federal regulators into believing what they wanted to believe, that market competition 
was lowering rates and that electricity could be bought and sold like any other 
commodity.  The reality was that high fixed infrastructure costs, increasing fuel prices, 
and the physics of the operation of the power grid make it very difficult to have a truly 
competitive market in the electricity industry. 
EPAct 2005 included requirements for state and federal regulators to be able to 
access utilities’ records and the legislation prohibited deceptive tactics that had been used 
by Enron and others, such as making false statements about electricity prices and 
artificially manipulating the market to change rates.104  A number of the provisions in 
EPAct 2005 that require market transparency and enforcement of legitimate business 
operations, though, will only be effective if the regulators have the expertise to catch 
attempts by electric power companies to use deceptive or illegal tactics.  California and 
other state and federal regulators were fooled by the deception of Enron, at least partially 
due to their limited knowledge about the technical aspects of electric power market 
operations as well as their willingness to trust at face value the apparent expertise of the 
power marketers.105 
Having robust technical knowledge cannot necessarily prevent government 
regulators from being fooled by a company that is determined to break the law and to use 
deception to cover its tracks, but a number of the tactics used by Enron and other power 
marketers should have raised flags that, if investigated, would likely have uncovered the 
widespread illegal activity.  For example, if the incredibly large swings in market 
electricity rates had been investigated, it should have been apparent that generators were 
being artificially shut down and transmission line usage was being falsified to drive up 
rates by fictitiously scheduling transmission requirements so they appeared to have 
reached the transmission lines’ congestion limits.  Enron and other power market traders 
were even willing to talk about their obviously illegal tactics on recorded trading phone 
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lines.106  The regulators need to have sufficient personnel with technical expertise who 
are able to identify areas of concern and investigate them to determine if there is in fact 
any wrongdoing.  To adequately regulate the electricity industry, as well as to force it to 
move toward a more resilient design, FERC and state regulators need to have sufficient 
numbers of internal electric power technical experts who are able to keep track of the 
almost 400,000 personnel working in the electric power industry at over 3,100 electric 
utilities.107  This is a significant oversight burden, in addition to FERC’s role in 
regulating the transmission and sale of oil and natural gas.  To accomplish it properly, 
FERC needs to have staff with the right expertise to monitor electricity industry 
operations and ensure utilities are not unjustifiably driving up rates or taking actions that 
will inhibit the reliable operation of the power grid. 
Over the years, FERC has been heavily influenced by partisan politics.  The five 
FERC commissioners are appointed by the President and historically Republican 
commissioners have favored policies that benefit investor-owned utilities and Democratic 
commissioners have favored publicly-owned utilities.108  The distinction in party biases 
was indicated clearly when Republican Ronald Reagan succeeded Democrat Jimmy 
Carter.  The FERC staff under President Carter had assigned preference to publically-
owned utilities in the process of bidding for the right to operate hydro-electric projects 
when the license came up for renewal.  Investor-owned utilities took FERC to court to get 
the position overturned and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of 
FERC’s assignment of preference.  However, President Reagan appointed commissioners 
who quickly reversed the course set by the previous FERC commissioners and staff and 
asked the Supreme Court to overrule the Circuit Court which had supported the original 
FERC position under President Carter’s administration.  The Supreme Court refused to 
overturn the Circuit Court in that case, but the impact of partisan politics on the operation 
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of the power grid can be seen in this example of the decisions made by FERC that were 
focused primarily on political objectives, in spite of the recommendations and experience 
of the FERC staff that had supported the initial FERC position.  During the Reagan 
administration, there were several changes which ultimately led to the elimination of the 
preference for publicly-owned utilities in taking over the operations of hydro-electric 
generators.  The FERC approach was able to be modified as a result of changes in the 
composition of the Circuit Court, continued lobbying by investor-owned utilities, and 
strong support from a number of state regulators who sided with investor-owned 
utilities.109  While publicly-owned utilities have continued to operate successfully in 
spite of the turn of events in this example, instability in regulatory policy due to partisan 
biases is not beneficial to the overall security of the operations of the electric power 
industry. To minimize partisanship in FERC, Congress should extend commissioners’ 
terms beyond the current five years and maintain the staggered replacement of 
commissioners so subsequent administrations are not able to quickly replace all or a 
majority of the commissioners.  Additionally, longer terms would provide more stability 
in the regulatory approach taken by the commission.  Continuity in the leadership of 
FERC would certainly be beneficial by providing a more stable platform that utilities 
could count on as they determine their long-term operational and investment strate
In addition to political party biases, a number of the commissioners have 
developed significant personal connections with the electric power industry.  The 
closeness of the relationships with industry has been evidenced in a number of examples 
where commissioners have transitioned directly from working for FERC to working in 
senior executive positions in the electricity sector.110  A collegial relationship between 
regulators and electric utilities can be beneficial by ensuring regulatory decisions do not 
unnecessarily impose detrimental requirements that may negatively affect the operation 
of the power grid.  However, close relationships that result in significant monetary 
compensation immediately following service in the regulatory agency will almost 
certainly cloud the judgment of the regulators.  Congress should establish a waiting 
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period of at least one year before FERC commissioners are able to work for the 
companies that are directly affected by FERC’s regulatory decisions.  To preserve an 
ethical standard that focuses on the reliable operation of the electric power grid rather 
than on industry and personal profits, a clear restriction should be placed on the ability of 
commissioners to profit monetarily from their role in FERC. 
  The background of the current commissioners is heavily weighted toward 
experience in law and energy policy at both the state and national level.111  The 
commissioners do not have technical experience in the operations of the electric power 
grid and much of their staff as well does not have a technical background based on 
electric power industry experience.  As a result, FERC is often put in a position of relying 
on the industry’s recommendations for policies that affect the operation of the grid.112  
The limited technical background of the commission, and the tendency at times for 
partisan bias, was clearly demonstrated during the California energy crisis when the 
commission under the Republican administration of President George W. Bush initially 
ignored calls for help from the Democratic governor of California.  FERC was initially 
biased in its assumption that the problems in California were self-inflicted as a result of 
environmentally conservative policies implemented by the state that had limited 
generation and transmission infrastructure from being built.  Even after it became 
apparent that Enron had been illegally manipulating the electricity market to increase its 
profits, at the expense of California consumers, FERC appeared to determine that it did 
not have the authority to intervene and help resolve the crisis.113  EPAct 2005 has since 
clearly assigned FERC the authority to obtain information from utilities and to prevent 
the abuse of the electricity market.114  But the lack of any effective action taken by 
FERC against the abusive actions of Enron, and other power marketers, calls into 
question how much more effective FERC will be now that it has been legislatively 
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assigned the authority to intercede in the market.  FERC needs both the legal authority as 
well as the technical expertise necessary to take effective action.  Changes in the law to 
provide authority will not change the regulation of the market until the technical 
capability is also present to enable the commission to successfully wie
To correct the technical shortfalls in the administration of FERC, Congress should 
require technical expertise be mandated, if not for the commissioners, at least within the 
direct supporting staff.  Obtaining the necessary expertise may require a more closely 
integrated relationship with the power industry, through NERC or other industry 
representatives.  Expertise may also already be available within some portions of the 
FERC organizational structure, but not necessarily at the level where it can provide the 
best effect on policy actions and oversight of the industry.  To facilitate the acquisition of 
personnel with technical operational experience, Congress could allocate funding marked 
specifically for hiring additional technical staff or consultants as an addition to the 
existing FERC budget.115  FERC is a large organization with over a thousand employees, 
many with apparently solid technical qualifications.  However, without the proper 
strategic guidance at the senior staff and management level where organizational policies 
are decided, the effectiveness of FERC’s industry oversight will continue to be limited, in 
spite of the changes made in EPAct 2005. 
C. REGULATIONS’ EFFECTS ON INFRASTRUCTURE 
FERC is responsible for regulating the operation of the electric power industry 
and overseeing the efforts of NERC to establish and enforce reliability standards.  Both 
organizations can improve the resiliency of the power grid as it is currently structured and 
operated, however they cannot require the utilities to build more transmission and 
generation infrastructure to increase the safety and operating margins of the grid.  NERC 
reliability standards focus on two concepts to ensure the reliability of the existing power 
grid:  adequacy and security.  Adequacy is a measure of the ability of the power grid to 
supply all of the power required to meet the demand of electricity customers at all times.  
Security focuses instead on the ability of the power grid to continue to operate after a 
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component outage, such as a transmission line or a generation facility that goes off-line 
and is no longer able to serve electricity customers.116  When the two concepts are 
maintained together, the result is a reliable power grid.  When utilities keep up with 
maintenance, such as trimming vegetation along the transmission line corridors, and 
ensure monitoring equipment is operating properly, the grid is and has been secure and 
reliable for most of its history.  The operating margin that determines the adequacy of the 
grid, though, has been declining over much of the last thirty years.  Congestion in the 
power grid has increased significantly, especially since the EPAct 1992 legislation 
opened the power grid to the addition of much more generation capacity through Exempt 
Wholesale Generators (EWGs).  The additional generation capacity has unfortunately not 
been matched by equivalent investments in transmission capacity.117  EPAct 1992 
required utilities to provide the use of their transmission lines to all EWGs, as well as to 
Qualifying Facilities (QFs) established under PURPA, at the same transmission rate that 
they charge their own generation facilities.118  The result of EPAct 1992 and PURPA 
was to create an environment where the “tragedy of the commons” applied to 
transmission line infrastructure.  The utility owners of the transmission lines are required 
to provide the benefits from their investment to all wholesale generators, while 
generation owners do not have to invest in transmission infrastructure.  As a result of the 
low overall cost for transmission being around 10% of the cost of providing electricity, 
there is not a significant portion of utility revenue generated from the operation of 
transmission lines.119  Utilities are reluctant to increase nonessential investments in 
transmission because all owners of generation will benefit and the overall impact on total 
revenue will be small.  This results in a tragedy of the commons situation since the 
common transmission infrastructure that is used by all parties provides little or no 
incentive for the owning utilities to invest in maintenance, upkeep, or expa
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Figure 2.   Transmission Investment and Electricity Retail Sales, 1975-2006. 
 
As a result of limited incentives to invest in transmission infrastructure and an 
emphasis on increasing generation capacity, especially through renewable energy and 
cogeneration sources, investment in transmission infrastructure in real dollars declined 
from 1975 through 1998.  Although investment has increased by roughly 12% per year 
since 1998, there have been more than two decades of inadequate investment in 
transmission (see Figure 2).120  Some regions of the country are worse off than others, 
with significant congestion on the transmission infrastructure providing regular 
constraints to the reliable operation of the power grid.  Corrective actions taken to 
prevent excessive loading on transmission lines when they are congested are called 
Transmission Loading Relief procedures (TLRs).  The number of TLRs required each 
year provides an indication of the increasing congestion on transmission line 
infrastructure.  TLRs have increased steadily each year since the implementation of 
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EPAct 1992, from 305 TLRs in 1998 to 1,494 in 2002 and to 1,901 in 2006.121  The 
continued growth in the number of TLRs indicates the recent increases in transmission 
infrastructure investment since 1998 will need to continue to grow for a significant 
number of years or grow at a faster rate before transmission capacity will begin to reverse 
the trends of a couple decades of insufficient investment.  In the 2006 National Electric 
Transmission Congestion Study, the Department of Energy (DOE) identified two 
significantly congested areas, called National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors 
(NIETCs), on the East Coast in the mid-Atlantic region and in Southern California.  
EPAct 2005 requires DOE to conduct congestion studies every three years and provides 
FERC with the authority to approve construction of transmission lines in a NIETC if it 
determines states have not acted on permitting requests for over a year.122  After the 
designation of the two NIETCs, though, U.S. Senators from those identified areas were 
quick to raise objections to the designation of locations in their states where FERC has 
the authority to overstep the role of state regulators and directly approve transmission line 
construction.123  The congressional response gives an indication of the difficulty of 
addressing the not in my backyard (NIMBY) sentiment that makes it hard to site 
transmission lines in areas where congestion is a problem. 
Due to the NIMBY political opposition to siting transmission lines in the areas 
where they are most needed, additional congressional action appears to be required to go 
beyond the EPAct 2005 authorization for FERC to directly approve permits for 
construction of transmission lines in NIETCs.  One approach Congress should consider is 
to implement a requirement that transmission siting locations must be approved prior to 
the construction of any generation capability.  Since growth in electricity demand is 
forecast by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) to continue to increase by 1.5% 
each year through 2030, generation facilities will need to continue to be constructed to 
meet the increasing demand as well as to replace older generation capacity as it reaches 
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the end of its service life and is taken off-line.124  By forcing a linkage of transmission 
siting and investment with generation siting and investment, both necessary to reliably 
meet growing electricity demand, states will be required to identify areas where 
additional transmission lines can be constructed.  This approach would serve to reduce 
the congestion on existing lines and improve the reliability and resiliency of the overall 
electric power grid.  There are other technological improvements that could also reduce 
the level of congestion on transmission lines, but ultimately additional transmission lines 
will need to be built to meet the projected growth in electricity demand.  Congress should 
act soon to ensure the long-term planning and investment in additional transmission 
infrastructure will accelerate to make up for decades of neglect. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS - LEGISLATION 
Regulatory action has the potential to both benefit and harm the security of U.S. 
critical infrastructure.  The establishment of an Electric Reliability Organization that is 
responsible for establishing and enforcing reliability standards was a much needed step in 
protecting the reliability of the electric power grid.  EPAct 1992, though, provides an 
example of harmful effects from government regulation.  The legislation contributed to a 
less secure architecture by reducing the incentive for utilities to invest in transmission 
infrastructure that must be made available for use by all wholesale electricity generators.  
Congress has significant room to improve the resiliency of the electric power 
infrastructure by expanding on some of the successes in EPAct 2005, adjusting the 
structure of regulatory agencies, and establishing robust requirements for planning for 
and investing in power grid infrastructure. 
1. Summary of Recommendations 
- Adequately fund and staff the ERO to train, evaluate, and enforce reliability 
standards; and continue to refine and improve those standards. 
 
124 Kevin L. Kliesen, "Electricity: The Next Energy Jolt?" The Regional Economist (October 2006), 7. 
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- Mandate technical expertise for a sufficient number of FERC personnel; and 
provide funding for the expert staff needed for rigorous oversight of the electric power 
industry. 
- Extend FERC commissioners terms to provide continuity in regulatory policy; 
and mandate high ethical standards by establishing a waiting period of at least one year 
before commissioners are able to profit from their prior role in FERC. 
- Mandate the designation and approval of needed transmission line siting before 
construction begins on new generation facilities. 
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IV. IMPROVING ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
SECURITY – INCENTIVES & STANDARDS 
Long-term infrastructure construction planning is ultimately tied to the anticipated 
effect it will have on the corporate bottom line.  The federal government has different 
objectives for infrastructure, taking into account the impact of investment decisions on 
national security objectives in addition to effects on the overall health of the economy.  
Establishing regulatory requirements aimed at improving the security of critical national 
infrastructure has an essential place in the government’s role of influencing electric 
power industry investment decisions, but there are also other non-regulatory tools 
available to the government to create an environment that pushes industry toward 
achieving national security objectives.  Taking a multifaceted approach to improving 
electric power critical infrastructure protection should have a much greater impact on 
security and reliability than focusing solely on regulation. 
A. INDUSTRY INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE SECURITY 
A combination of government incentives will likely be necessary to address the 
cumulative shortfall in transmission infrastructure investments over the last three decades 
and to correct the conditions that led to a tragedy of the commons situation.125  As a 
result of the EPAct 1992 requirement to provide equal transmission line access to Exempt 
Wholesale Generators (EWGs), the benefits of owning transmission line infrastructure 
have been significantly decreased.  The profit incentive of owning transmission 
infrastructure was reduced by being required to share the benefits of transmission line 
ownership with companies that do not have to expend their own capital up front on high 
cost transmission lines and then depreciate those assets over many years.  The 
construction costs to build transmission lines, depending on the voltage level, for above 
ground lines can range from $130 thousand per mile for 115 kilovolt lines up to $840 
thousand per mile for 230 kilovolt lines and the costs can reach almost $4 million per 
 
125 Abel, Electric Transmission: Approaches for Energizing a Sagging Industry, 9. 
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mile for underground 230 kilovolt lines.126  Construction costs for higher voltage above 
ground transmission lines, up to 765 kilovolts, can also range into the multiple millions 
of dollars per mile.127  These capital expenditures for transmission infrastructure, which 
must be amortized over a number of years, need to be compared to other investment areas 
that can potentially lead to more consistent expectations of greater returns on investment, 
such as the construction of new generation facilities. 
The return on investment for transmission line infrastructure is complicated by the 
overlap of rate setting authority between state regulators that set rates for utilities’ base 
customers and federal regulation by FERC that sets rates for wholesale electricity sales.  
The rates of return for transmission lines are thus affected by two separate regulatory 
agencies, making it more difficult to determine the expected rate of return, what level the 
electricity retail rates will be, and what events may lead to increases or cuts in the rates.  
For example, in a couple cases in California, the decision on the allowed rate of return 
was transferred from the state to FERC.  The expected rate of return of 12.5% initially set 
by CA regulators was then reduced in the FERC approved rates for these two cases to 
9.7% and 9.8%.128  In the assessment of capital investment options, the allowed rates of 
return on investment is a concern, especially as the ratings of credit worthiness for 
utilities has declined sharply in recent years since the electricity market crash in 2001 due 
to abuses by Enron and other power marketers.129  The uncertainty in investment returns 
and declining credit ratings negatively impacts the decisions to consider new 
transmission infrastructure investment. 
The overlap in rate setting between states for retail sales and FERC for wholesale 
sales of electricity typically results in utilities’ base customers paying for most of the 
infrastructure investment costs.  A credit is returned to base customers which is 
 
126 Warkentin-Glenn, Electric Power Industry in Nontechnical Language, 167. 
127 American Electric Power, "Interstate Transmission Vision for Wind Integration," Columbus, OH, 
2008, http://www.aep.com/about/i765project/docs/windtransmissionvisionwhitepaper.pdf (accessed 
November 10, 2008). 
128 Eric Hirst, Expanding U.S. Transmission Capacity (Oak Ridge, TN: Consulting in Electric-
Industry Restructuring, 2000), 14-15. 
129 Gregory Basheda et al., Why are Electricity Prices Increasing? An Industry-Wide Perspective 
(Washington, DC: The Edison Foundation, 2006), 81-82. 
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equivalent to the income utilities receive for wholesale transmission of electricity to other 
regions.  The result is that utilities may not receive any financial benefit from meeting the 
requirements of the law to provide equal access to their transmission infrastructure for 
wholesale electricity transfers because the payment for wholesale transfers is used to 
reduce base customers rates.130  The wholesale transfers, though, may increase 
congestion and require additional effort by the utilities to control the operation of the grid 
without providing additional financial benefit to the utility.  This undermines the 
incentive to expand and improve infrastructure since it limits potential gains from the 
investments.  The complications of dealing with multiple rate setting agencies and the 
limitations on potential returns on investment are likely to push transmission 
infrastructure investment down in priority in long-term planning by electric utilities. 
Additionally, when EWGs have equal access to transmission lines, the available 
market share can be decreased for utilities’ own generation facilities if the lines begin to 
approach congestion limits.  Transmission line owners would ideally seek to use the 
maximum capacity of their lines to deliver their own generated electricity, either to their 
base customers or to sell to other utilities, so they can maximize the available profit from 
their generation assets.  Since adding transmission capacity can provide an increased 
market for EWGs, utilities may also be reluctant to expand transmission infrastructure 
that would benefit their competitors.  If relieving local congestion through expanding 
transmission capacity will provide increased opportunity for competitors to transmit 
power from newer, less expensive generation facilities, then utilities will be inclined to 
maintain the current transmission infrastructure level, rather than expand, in order to 
protect the profits from their retail base.131  The resulting environment creates a 
significant disincentive to invest in transmission infrastructure and instead to rely on 
existing transmission lines or look to other companies to shoulder the risk of building 
additional transmission infrastructure. 
 
130 Ross Baldick et al., A National Perspective on Allocating the Costs of New Transmission 
Investment: Practice and Principle (Washington, DC: Working Group for Investment in Reliable and 
Economic Electric Systems (WIRES), 2007), 27. 
131 Ibid., 44-45. 
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To offset the reasons that utilities are reluctant to invest in transmission 
infrastructure, government incentives can be developed to reduce the risks and improve 
the potential rates of return.  Incentives will need to be designed to provide a long-term 
effect due to the need for utilities to amortize construction costs over many years.  
Incentives that will only be in place for a few years will be unlikely to provide sufficient 
incentive to convince utilities to build new infrastructure.  To be effective, utilities will 
need to be assured that the incentives will be in place long enough for the utilities to 
justify the high up-front capital expenditures required for construction of new 
infrastructure. 
Several options can be provided to offset the risk to utilities for transmission 
investment.  The incentives could be in the form of direct monetary provisions, such as 
through government grants or cost sharing arrangements, designed to reduce the level of 
industry investment and associated risk required to build transmission lines.  It will be 
difficult to gain political support for this approach since it would expand government 
expenditure in an area of the economy that is fairly stable.  While the costs of other 
energy sources such as oil and gas have suffered significant price volatility, electricity 
rates have been fairly steady for several decades.  Adjusted for inflation, the rates for 
electricity have actually declined most years since the early 1980s (see Figure 3).132  A 
potentially more palatable government approach would be to allocate funding for 
construction of government-owned transmission lines such as the ones currently owned 
by municipal utilities in a number of states.  However, the large majority of customers are 
served by investor-owned utilities and expanding the government role as an electricity 
service provider is also unlikely to receive a high level of political support.133 
 
132 Energy price data from Energy Information Agency, in real 2000 $; Residential electricity prices 
from Table 8.10, “Average Retail Prices of Electricity, 1960-2007;” Natural gas prices from Table 6.8, 
“Natural Gas Prices by Sector, 1967-2007;” Crude oil prices from Table 5.21, “Crude Oil Refiner 
Acquisition Costs, 1968-2007” in Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2007. 
133 In 2005, investor-owned utilities generated 43%, non-utilities generated 35%, government-owned 
utilities generated 17%, and cooperatives generated 5%.  See Edison Electric Institute, Statistical Yearbook 






































































































Figure 3.   Energy Prices for Electricity, Natural Gas, and Crude Oil, 1968-2007. 
 
It would be potentially much better received to use tax breaks for construction 
expenditures like has been done for some energy tax relief in the EPAct 2005 legislation.  
EPAct 2005 focused tax breaks primarily on increasing domestic energy sources and 
improving energy efficiency.  There is only one provision that addresses transmission 
infrastructure, decreasing the depreciation timeline for transmission investments from 
twenty years to fifteen years.  The only tax breaks specifically for infrastructure 
investments are for environmentally cleaner generation, both for clean coal and nuclear 
generation facility construction.134  To improve the reliability of the electric power grid, 
tax breaks need to be directed toward reducing the cost of investing in transmission 
infrastructure, making construction decisions more attractive to industry.  These tax 
breaks would need to be extended over the full amortization period of the costs for the 
infrastructure, to provide sufficient justification for the utilities to approve the 
expenditures.  While short-term tax incentives may spur some investment, they will have 
                                                 




                                                
a limited effect on the long-term planning required for most infrastructure investment.  
Any sunset clauses for tax incentives should be aligned with time frames that will allow 
industry to count on them in their long-term planning.  This may require committing to 
fifteen or more years of tax breaks for infrastructure investments, in line with the allowed 
depreciation timeline for transmission line construction costs.  The increased time span 
will be more difficult to gain congressional support, but it is essential to making the tax 
breaks a realistic tool to expand infrastructure investment.  Shorter term tax breaks may 
support political rhetoric on improving the reliability of energy sources, but they will not 
have the long-term effects that the nation needs to build resilient critical infrastructure. 
In addition to providing incentives for transmission line investments, the 
resiliency of the electric power grid can also be improved by supporting efforts to expand 
the use of distributed generation.  When electricity is generated close to where it is 
consumed, it reduces the need for transmission infrastructure.  Distributed generation can 
be provided with conventional fossil fuel powered generation facilities and it can also be 
accomplished with renewable energy sources.  For example, projects have been 
undertaken to construct solar power generation in sunny regions to provide local, long-
term renewable sources of power generation.  A 15 megawatt project at Nellis Air Force 
Base in Nevada was implemented in 2007 under an arrangement between the local power 
company, two renewable energy companies, and the base to provide more than a quarter 
of the base power needs from a solar array located on base property, minimizing the need 
for additional transmission infrastructure.135  Since distributed generation will most often 
not be as efficient as large centralized power plants, a focus on renewable energy sources 
that are cheaper than fossil fuels can help to offset the decrease in efficiency from using 
smaller distributed generation sources.  The high construction costs for many renewable 
energy sources will make long-term incentives even more important to encourage 
investment.  Government incentives to construct distributed renewable generation 
facilities can provide multiple benefits through reductions in the use of fossil fuels, an 
associated decrease in environmental impact, and improvements in the security of electric 
 
135 Seamus O'Connor, "Solar Panels at Nellis could be Win-Win," Air Force TimesNovember 19, 
2007, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2007/11/airforce_nellis_solar_071119w/ (accessed November 
11, 2008). 
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power critical infrastructure as a result of reducing dependence on large, centralized 
generation facilities and long-distance transmission lines. 
No matter which method is selected to provide incentives for infrastructure 
investment that will improve the resiliency of the electric power grid, it will only have a 
significant effect if it is designed to be stable for a number of years.  Utilities will need to 
be able to rely on the incentives to plan their investments.  A lack of consistency in the 
rate of return on investments and uncertainty in the ability to recover costs reduces 
utilities’ willingness to build new infrastructure.136  Government approaches to improve 
infrastructure security need to take into account the timeline of industry planning and 
ensure incentives are extended for maximum effect. 
B. ESTABLISH STANDARDS TO IMPROVE SECURITY AND 
RELIABILITY 
In addition to providing financial incentives to increase the resiliency of the 
electric power grid, governmental authorities can mandate the implementation of 
standards designed to improve the reliability and security of critical infrastructure.  
EPAct 2005 gave FERC the authority to designate an Electricity Reliability Organization 
(ERO) which it did in 2006, assigning the responsibility to NERC.  NERC has 
established a number of reliability standards that focus primarily on procedural 
requirements, including analysis, planning, maintenance, and operations of the power 
grid as well as requirements for training, operating safely, preparing for emergencies, and 
providing physical and cyber security.137  These standards are an excellent basis for 
improving the day-to-day operations of the electric power system and preparing for 
emergencies and component failures.  The legislative changes that allow the ERO to 
enforce the reliability standards is a great step toward improving the reliable operation of 
the electric power system and preventing a large regional blackout like the one that 
occurred in August 2003. 
 
136 Bob Shively and John Ferrare, Understanding Today’s Electricity Business (San Francisco: 
Enerdynamics, 2007), 59-61. 
137 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "Standards: Reliability Standards." 
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There is room, however, to move beyond the existing procedural reliability 
standards and several requirements for security and safety measures to also address some 
specific design requirements that can improve system reliability.  The standards 
established by the ERO will work well to ensure the system operates reliably based on 
the current system design and associated operating procedures.  If the NERC standards 
had been followed in Ohio in 2003, they could have prevented the August 2003 blackout.  
Procedures such as ensuring adequate vegetation management along transmission lines 
and verifying full operational capability of the emergency monitoring systems would 
likely have prevented the 2003 blackout.138  These procedural reliability standards are 
not designed, though, to take advantage of new technology or to force changes to the 
design of the power grid to make it more resilient to multiple sources of fa
Some regions have implemented power grid design standards very successfully 
that have improved system reliability, such as the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) 
which required that generators could not be constructed until a power system analysis 
demonstrated the generation capacity could supply all of New England customers even 
when all existing generation facilities were also operating.  In some cases this forced the 
construction of additional transmission lines to ensure the existing lines were not 
overloaded by the new generation facilities.  The design standard provides for a much 
more robust power grid in New England that was able to avoid any significant impacts 
from the cascading outages during the August 2003 blackout.139  Design standards such 
as this one implemented by NEPOOL shift the focus toward designing a more resilient 
grid during the planning for new infrastructure construction. 
Another example of a change in system design standards that would be more 
resilient to component failures would be to expand the use of distributed generation so 
power is generated in close proximity to where it will be used.  Distributed generation 
reduces dependence on congested transmission lines and limits cascading failures 
throughout the power grid since any failure of distributed generators would have a 
 
138 Auerswald et al., Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action can Reduce Public 
Vulnerability, 168. 
139 Weil, Blackout: How the Electric Industry Exploits America, 114. 
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localized impact on the customers for that facility.  To increase the use of distributed 
generation, standards need to be developed for interconnection to the power grid for 
independently operated distributed generation facilities.  There are no existing standards 
that define how to connect to the power grid.140  Congress would not need to specify the 
details of the grid interconnection standard, but rather they could mandate that the 
standard be developed and enforced.  Standard setting organizations such as IEEE could 
develop the standard with industry input and then the ERO could be authorized to enforce 
the implementation of the standard.  Standards such as this example for connecting 
distributed generation facilities to the power grid will likely require government backing 
to force industry to accept the standard since there is a potential for utilities to lose profits 
from their existing centrally located, large generation facilities.  Independently run 
distributed generation facilities could decrease the customer base for utilities, while still 
requiring a connection to the power grid for emergency backup and potentially to meet 
local peak demand requirements. 
There is nothing to prevent utilities from benefiting from the distributed 
generation approach, however, by entering into agreements to construct and maintain 
distributed generation facilities.  Many communities that consider building a reliable 
local power source would be interested in accessing the technical and management 
expertise provided by electric utility companies.  Since growth in demand for electricity 
generation is expected to increase significantly in the next five to ten years, distributed 
generation could be a profitable enterprise for utilities.141  Urban areas will still need to 
maintain large, centralized generation facilities and some regions will not be interested in 
the up-front expense to build distributed generation.  For those areas that are willing to 
spend the capital, though, the interconnection standards would enable a more resilient 
overall design for the electric power grid.  The initiative could also be linked to 
conservation measures that focus on developing distributed generation facilities that 
operate using renewable energy sources.  These potential benefits alone are unlikely to be 
sufficient to push many utilities into investing in distributed generation, though, until a 
 
140 Morrison and Broad, "Wind Interconnection: Bridging the Divide," 32-33. 
141 Shively and Ferrare, Understanding Today’s Electricity Business, 160. 
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mandatory interconnection standard is adopted that guarantees the consistent ability for 
small generation facilities to be connected to the power grid and opens a competitive 
environment for local communities to develop reliable local generation capability. 
An additional area where government mandated standards could improve the 
resiliency of the power grid is the establishment of a design standard for large 
transformers.  Transformers are an essential component of the electric power grid, 
allowing electricity to be stepped up to a high voltage level that can be efficiently 
transmitted from where it is generated, the source, to where it will be consumed, the load, 
and then stepped down to a lower voltage that can be used by the utilities’ customers.  
Transformers are also used to change voltage levels at intermediate points in the power 
grid to meet the requirements of different industrial, commercial, and residential 
customers.  Additionally, they are used to enhance safety when electricity is transferred 
to lower voltage distribution lines to complete the circuit as electricity is provided to 
smaller commercial or residential customers.  High voltage transformers are very 
expensive, costing as much as $6 million each, and they can take as long as a year to 
manufacture.  Many of these high voltage transformers are individually made to custom 
specifications according to utilities’ requirements for the unique design of their 
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure.142  The grid designs are often 
not built around the design of high voltage transformers, but rather the transformers are 
designed to meet the needs of the unique grid configuration. 
Transformers are components of the grid that regularly fail for any of a number of 
reasons, including lightning strikes and other voltage spikes, manufacturing defects, 
overloading, and deterioration over time.143  Transformers can also be fairly easily 
damaged or destroyed by an individual.  Sabotage can even be accomplished from a 
distance with small arms fire.  With the establishment of standard design criteria for 
transformers, the resiliency of the grid can be improved by maintaining a spare stock of 
 
142 Auerswald et al., Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action can Reduce Public 
Vulnerability, 208. 
143 William H. Bartley, "An Analysis of Transformer Failures, Part 2 – Causes, Prevention and 
Maximum Service Life," Hartford, CT, 1997, http://www.hsb.com/thelocomotive/Story/FullStory/ST-FS-
LOTRANS2.html (accessed November 9, 2008). 
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standard transformers that can be used throughout the country to replace transformers 
when they fail.  Some regional electricity organizations, such as PJM Interconnection in 
the Mid-Atlantic area, have proposed the design of a standard transformer for some 
applications, but industry has not yet widely adopted the approach of designing standard, 
interchangeable transformers.144  Congressional direction can redirect the debate over the 
concept and focus industry efforts on developing and implementing a common design.  
Legislation could assign NERC, the ERO, with the responsibility of coordinating the 
design effort with industry and standard setting organizations.  NERC’s focus is on 
improving the reliability of the electric power grid and its membership includes electric 
utilities with industry technical expertise that will be essential to guiding the design 
standard effort.145  The structure exists in the electric power industry for standards to be 
developed and implemented, but it appears that government intervention is required to 
expand the scope of ERO reliability standards to include grid interconnections and 
electric power component designs in order to incrementally improve the security and 
reliability of the power grid. 
C. FOSTER INNOVATION TO IMPROVE SECURITY 
The regulatory environment affecting the energy sector has seen multiple changes 
in recent years through the implementation of EPAct 1992, EPAct 2005, and several 
implementation orders released by FERC.  As a result of uncertainty about future changes 
in energy regulations, the environment is not very conducive to significant investment in 
innovative designs that could improve the operations of the electric power industry.  A 
number of ideas have been proposed, for example, under the Smart Grid concept.  The 
U.S. National Energy Technology Laboratory provides a description of the concept as 
including:  self-healing capability, consumer participation in the operation of the grid, 
resilience to attack, consistent power quality, accommodation of various generation 
technologies, competition in power markets, and optimized infrastructure assets (see 
 
144 Auerswald et al., Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action can Reduce Public 
Vulnerability, 209. 
145 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "NERC: About NERC," Princeton, NJ, 2008, 
http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1 (accessed November 9, 2008). 
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Table 1 for a comparison of the existing grid to the Smart Grid concept).146  The 
government should actively encourage the continued design, development, and testing of 
these and other innovations which have the potential to improve the resiliency of the 
electric power grid.  Some of the ideas will require further research which could be taken 
on by government research laboratories as well as through government sponsored 
research at universities and collaboration with industry research and development efforts. 
The Smart Grid of the Future 
20th Century Grid   21st Century Smart Grid   
Electromechanical   Digital   
One-way communications (if any)   Two-way communications   
Built for centralized generation   Accommodates distributed generation   
Radial topology   Network topology   
Few sensors   Monitors and sensors throughout   
“Blind”   Self-monitoring   
Manual restoration   Semi-automated restoration and, 
eventually, self-healing   
Prone to failures and blackouts   Adaptive protection and islanding   
Check equipment manually   Monitor equipment remotely   
Emergency decisions by committee and 
phone   
Decision support systems, predictive 
reliability   
Limited control over power flows   Pervasive control systems   
Limited price information   Full price information   
Few customer choices   Many customer choices   
Table 1.   The Smart Grid of the Future.147 
 
One area that has the potential to considerably improve the reliability and capacity 
of existing infrastructure is the use of solid state power control devices to handle 
transmission line monitoring, switching, and control tasks.  These solid state devices have 
the potential to replace existing traditional electro-mechanical power control components 
such as switches, controllers, and capacitors.  Their design allows electric power to be 
                                                 
146 Global Environment Fund and Center for Smart Energy, The Emerging Smart Grid: Investment 
and Entrepreneurial Potential in the Electric Power Grid of the Future, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC and 
Redmond, WA: Global Environment Fund and Center for Smart Energy, 2006), 2. 
147 Table 1, The Smart Grid of the Future, see Global Environment Fund and Center for Smart Energy, 
The Emerging Smart Grid: Investment and Entrepreneurial Potential in the Electric Power Grid of the 
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controlled quickly and accurately as it is transferred to high voltage transmission lines.  
Solid state high voltage and high current devices can also improve reliability, increase 
infrastructure capacity, and respond quickly to changes in electric loads.  They have the 
potential to handle higher congestion on transmission lines and respond quickly to many 
changes in the configuration of the power grid.  There are concerns, though, about the 
long-term reliability of these new power electronic devices and in the ability to 
adequately and reliably control them in distributed locations throughout the grid.  The 
ability for distributed devices to automatically respond to changes in the power grid, 
maintaining its balance and stability, has not yet been tested and proven to be as reliable 
as the current centrally managed and controlled design using electro-mechanical 
components.148  Power electronic devices have the potential, though, to increase the 
capacity, reliability, and control capability of the electric power grid if they can be 
properly tested and shown to be as safe and secure as existing power control devices.  
The government can invest in verification of the newer technology, fostering the 
continued development and application of design improvements. 
The government can also encourage the development of storage capacity options 
which would increase the reliable operation of the power grid during times of peak 
demand and in cases of infrastructure outages.  Industry is looking into options such as 
large battery storage and systems that can provide short term power capability to bridge 
gaps during a power outage, such as flywheels and compressed gas.  One concept that has 
so far only been analyzed and tested on a small scale is the potential for electric and 
hybrid vehicles to use the stored energy in their batteries to provide power back to the 
power grid.  The supply from car batteries could be especially useful during peak load 
periods in the middle of the day when many of the cars would be parked at office 
buildings.  If the concept was further researched and tested, it has the potential to 
improve the reliability of the grid by handling some of the load during high demand 
periods, effectively increasing the available electricity supply. 
 
148 Warkentin-Glenn, Electric Power Industry in Nontechnical Language, 77, 79; Basheda et al., Why 
are Electricity Prices Increasing? An Industry-Wide Perspective, 60. 
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As more cars with large rechargeable batteries are purchased, the available battery 
capacity increases significantly each year.  A number of issues would need to be 
addressed to make the concept viable, such as how to transfer the power from the car 
batteries back into the power grid and then distribute it to where it is needed as well as 
how to compensate the car owners for the use of their batteries.  EPAct 2005 encouraged 
states to consider the use of net metering which would allow for electric utility customers 
to sell power back to the grid.  Most states have some level of approval in place for the 
use of net metering, largely to account for electricity generated by renewable energy 
sources, such as wind or solar, that are able to provide some excess power to the grid.149  
Net metering capability could be applied to the use of vehicle batteries as a source of 
energy for the power grid.  There are also a number of potential solutions to compensate 
owners for the use of their batteries.  The utilities could guarantee the proper function of 
the batteries for a set number of years, they could establish an agreement to replace the 
vehicle batteries when their storage capability declined below an acceptable threshold, or 
they could financially compensate the owners for the amount of power provided back to 
the grid through net metering. 
The potential exists for a significant amount of power to be available from vehicle 
batteries, with estimates that if 25% of cars on the road were hybrid or electric vehicles, 
they could supply enough power to be roughly equivalent to the entire current U.S. power 
generation capacity.  It would require fewer than 100 vehicles, out of this large potential 
source of electricity, to provide utilities with an economically useful amount of power of 
one megawatt.150  Vehicle batteries provide a significant potential to improve the 
resiliency of the grid and facilitate leveling of the fluctuation in the power demand during 
the day.  The government has the opportunity to encourage and support research into new 
applications of technology to improve the operations of the electric power grid.  A 
number of innovative concepts and technologies have been around for many years and 
are ready to be put into use.  Government advocacy and direct support for research could 
 
149 Basheda et al., Why are Electricity Prices Increasing? An Industry-Wide Perspective, 49. 
150 Willett Kempton and Jasna Tomić, "Vehicle-to-Grid Power Implementation: From Stabilizing the 
Grid to Supporting Large-Scale Renewable Energy," Journal of Power Sources 144, no. 1 (June 1, 2005), 
281-82. 
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provide the additional boost required to bring some of these ideas to the point of 
implementation in the electric power industry. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS – INCENTIVES AND STANDARDS 
A combination of approaches should be considered by federal and state regulators 
to improve the resiliency of electric power infrastructure.  Investor-Owned Utilities 
(IOUs) account for the large majority of power supplied in the U.S. and making a 
consistent profit is the primary incentive for IOU investment decisions.  Industry is 
interested in ensuring the power grid operates reliably to provide power to their 
customers, but the government needs to also take into account national security 
requirements for a power grid that is resilient to many potential disruptions.  The various 
changes in energy legislation provide an indication of the difficulty in getting the right 
mix of requirements specified that will create stable and secure energy infrastructure.  A 
combination of approaches is more likely to be successful in building resiliency into the 
power grid, including reducing or eliminating regulatory barriers to infrastructure 
investment, providing financial incentives for industry to invest in infrastructure security, 
and setting design standards that will improve reliability as well as take advantage of 
innovative technologies.  No one solution is likely to achieve the level of security 
required to ensure electricity is able to reliably sustain national critical infrastructure.  
The critical role of reliable electricity in the modern economic system highlights the need 
to take all appropriate measures to ensure the proper continued operation of the electric 
power grid. 
1. Summary of Recommendations 
- Provide long-term financial incentives, including grants, cost sharing, and tax 
breaks for infrastructure investments in transmission lines and distributed generation. 
- Establish design standards for grid interconnection, large transformers, and other 
critical infrastructure components. 
- Foster innovative designs such as the Smart Grid, solid state power control 
devices, and grid connection of electric and hybrid vehicle batteries. 
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V. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Addressing the weaknesses in the electric power grid is critically important to 
achieving U.S. national security objectives.  The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security identifies four national focus areas: 
• Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; 
• Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources; 
• Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and 
• Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success.151 
To successfully address the second and fourth focus areas, protecting critical 
infrastructure and strengthening the foundation of U.S. homeland security, it is essential 
to maximize the resiliency of electric power infrastructure.  The power grid underpins all 
other critical infrastructure sectors and enables the successful operation of the national 
economy.  Due to the foundational nature of the use of electricity in society and the fact 
that power is typically delivered reliably every day, it is easy to overlook electric power 
infrastructure and shift the focus of national efforts to other pressing priorities.  Major 
power outages do not occur frequently.  Excluding several outages in areas impacted by 
hurricanes, it has been more than five years since the last widespread regional blackout.  
The economic damage from the August 2003 blackout reached into the multiple billions 
of dollars, though, and it disrupted hospitals, grocery stores, financial markets, and many 
other essential aspects of the economy in the Midwest and Northeast for one to two days 
and for several additional days in some of the affected areas.152 
Despite the infrequent nature of blackouts, the costs are extremely high when they 
do occur and as congestion increases throughout the power grid and as infrastructure 
ages, there is an increasing potential for another major outage.  Stresses from an 
environmental disaster or deliberate sabotage would also increase the possibility of an 
 
151 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 1. 
152 Auerswald et al., Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action can Reduce Public 
Vulnerability, 121, 166, 212. 
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extended regional blackout.  The best protection for the electric power grid is to make the 
infrastructure more resilient to potential failures.  Sustaining momentum behind 
infrastructure investments will require reminding regulators and legislators of the risks 
and potential damages of another widespread blackout and building support behind 
implementing a number of the options recommended in this paper that can significantly 
improve infrastructure security. 
A. OVERCOMING POLITICAL AND INDUSTRY OPPOSITION TO 
CHANGE 
The historical gap between the passage of major pieces of energy legislation and 
the years of debate that precede significant policy change provide an indication of how 
difficult it is to reach a consensus on the appropriate direction for U.S. energy policy.  
Major energy legislation has been enacted in 1935, 1978, 1992, and 2005.  Well over a 
decade has passed between each of these legislative measures.  One example of the 
lengthy timeline between the introduction of ideas for policy change and the actual 
implementation of the change is demonstrated with Exempt Wholesale Generators 
(EWGs).  Senator J. Bennett Johnston initially introduced EWGs in a legislative 
amendment submitted in 1989, but the idea was debated for three more years before it 
was enacted in EPAct 1992.153  Similarly, policy changes that were enacted in EPAct 
2005, such as establishing an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) and reforming 
PUHCA, had been debated since at least the summer of 2003.  Pressure to pass a change 
in energy policy increased after the August 2003 blackout, but it took two more years of 
debate before the changes became law.154  Attempting to make additional significant 
changes to energy policy at this point will be difficult and it will require a focused effort 
to emphasize the importance of the needed changes and to address the likely objections to 
further policy changes. 
Efforts to improve the security of the electric power grid, as well as the broader 
energy sector, would benefit from an integrated approach that includes the various 
 
153 Energy Information Administration, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992, 33. 
154 Robert Bamberger, Energy Policy: The Continuing Debate and Omnibus Energy Legislation 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), 10. 
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stakeholders involved in establishing and implementing energy policy, to include DOE, 
DHS, FERC, NERC, industry representatives, state regulators, and the congressional 
committees on energy, infrastructure, and homeland security.  Complete consensus will 
not likely be reached between all of the affected agencies, organizations, legislators, and 
businesses, but the ability for policy to achieve its intended objectives is greatly increased 
when there is buy-in from as many of the stakeholders as possible.  Focusing on the 
national strategic objectives of protecting critical infrastructure and preserving the 
foundational infrastructure of the national economy will help to guide the debate over the 
measures that need to be implemented. 
The reliability and security of the electric power grid is one part of the broader 
responsibility for ensuring the protection of all critical infrastructure sectors.  Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) assigns the responsibility to the Secretary of 
DHS for national planning and implementation efforts related to critical infrastructure 
protection.155  Integrating the disparate objectives found at the state and federal levels, as 
well as between government and industry, is a role that can be appropriately assumed by 
DHS.  The EPAct 1992 requirement for market competition was held up in the courts for 
eight years.  To avoid such lengthy legal battles between government regulators and 
industry, it would be beneficial to bring industry into the discussion and work to arrive at 
the best supportable solution that balances national security requirements with industry 
profit objectives.  Whether the leadership on energy infrastructure security falls to DHS 
or another agency, the objective should be to maximize the benefits of industry expertise 
combined with a national government perspective on security requirements. 
The majority of electric power infrastructure is owned and operated by the private 
sector.  As a result, their expertise will be greatly beneficial to the development of policy 
changes designed to improve the resiliency of the power grid through the development of 
realistic objectives, such as expanding the use of distributed generation and standardizing 
high voltage transformer designs.  By giving industry representatives an integral role in 
designing the objectives for improving infrastructure security, industry should develop a 
 
155 Bush, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection," par. 12-15, 27. 
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sense of ownership in the process and it should result in policies that are better able to 
achieve security goals.  With industry collaboration on the policy development, the 
resulting government requirements will be less likely to be held up in court for years and 
industry will be less likely to attempt to find ways to circumvent the intent of the 
regulations. 
Industry representatives can also help to focus initial efforts on the most 
promising technologies that should achieve the biggest improvements in security.  Within 
the Smart Grid concepts there are many areas that can be developed to improve the 
security of the power grid.  Even within a single area of technology application, such as 
solid state power control devices, there are multiple options to use the devices for 
switches, controllers, capacitors, and other components that can improve the time 
response and precision of control over the operation of the power grid.156  The process of 
selecting the technologies and applications that will take advantage of mature 
technologies and achieve the best effects, within the confines of available funding, will 
appreciably benefit from close coordination with industry representatives.  There is a 
double benefit from an integrated government-industry team.  Industry representatives 
will gain ownership in the infrastructure security improvement process and the policy 
development team will have access to extensive technical expertise.  The use of an 
integrated team should also facilitate the development of a consensus within Congress on 
the approach recommended by the government-industry team for implementing policy 
changes.  If industry is lobbying for the recommended policy changes, it will increase the 
likelihood of sufficient congressional support to implement the changes. 
Congressional endorsement of power grid infrastructure security improvements 
will require bipartisan support.  While there is significant partisan debate on the best 
approaches to achieve energy independence and to protect the environment, it should be a 
fairly nonpartisan issue to improve the reliable operation of the power grid, even when 
equipment failures, natural disasters, or sabotage occurs.  There may be debate, though, 
over the particular methods selected, especially if an impression is created that the 
 
156 Warkentin-Glenn, Electric Power Industry in Nontechnical Language, 77. 
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electricity industry is receiving preferential government treatment.  To address the 
potential for partisan opposition to security policy improvements, it will be important to 
work closely with the congressional staff members on the energy, infrastructure, and 
homeland security committees, as well as with the personal staff for the chairman and 
ranking minority members on each of these committees.  In many cases it is the 
congressional staff members that define the policy objectives pursued by their 
congressional committees.  Due to the prominence of issues such as volatile fossil fuel 
prices and the need to protect Americans from terrorist attacks, there will be significant 
competing priorities vying for the attention of personal and professional staff members 
associated with the energy, infrastructure, and homeland security committees.  
Convincing these staff members of the foundational importance of electric power 
infrastructure will be an essential component of the strategy to implement needed policy 
changes.  The lack of incentives in EPAct 2005 that were focused on transmission 
infrastructure and power grid technology improvements provides an indication of the 
difficulty that will be encountered in attempting to implement much needed power grid 
security policy.  To make progress on electric power infrastructure security objectives, it 
will be essential to invest significant personnel resources from industry and government 
regulatory agencies into the education of the appropriate congressional committee staff 
members to gain their support for the needed policy improvements. 
To secure the full support of industry for implementing security policy changes, it 
will take more than just informing industry representatives about the decisions made by 
the government team.  The government leaders on the policy analysis team, likely 
coming from DHS, will need to work with industry to prioritize the measures that are 
expected to have the greatest impact on improving the security of electric power critical 
infrastructure.  Although grants and cost sharing for these measures would likely be 
industry’s preferred method for government incentives, as discussed earlier, it is more 
likely that Congress would support tax breaks rather than direct funding.  The best 
structure for tax breaks should be recommended by industry.  Industry should be able to 
provide an assessment of the impact of different tax incentives on their ability to obtain 
the funding needed to invest in transmission infrastructure or other security 
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improvements.  The policy analysis team should then develop a Business Case Analysis 
(BCA), or equivalent assessment, of the expected benefit to industry from the proposed 
tax breaks, given the existing regulatory environment and anticipated market dynamics.  
The purpose of a BCA is to assess a proposed strategy to determine the expected 
financial and business impacts of the strategy.157  In the case of the proposed energy 
policy, for it to be accepted by industry, the BCA will need to demonstrate how the 
policy will maintain or increase electric power industry profit margins.  The assessment 
should aim to show that industry can make a reasonable profit, while also supporting 
national security objectives.  Involving industry representatives in the development of the 
BCA will improve the accuracy of the analysis and help to focus the policy options on 
those that are most likely to create strong incentives for industry to invest in 
infrastructure security. 
Even with the introduction of government incentives to encourage infrastructure 
investments, there will likely still be companies in the electricity industry that are not 
interested in any type of energy policy change.  Volatility in the regulatory environment 
makes it difficult for companies to perform long-term investment planning and it can 
undermine existing plans that have already been initiated.  Some portions of industry are 
likely to favor the status quo rather than risk the potential that additional policy changes 
will hurt their business plans.  To be successful in winning widespread industry support 
for new policies, the proposed government approach will first need to be clearly 
articulated in a BCA.  The benefits will then need to be marketed to industry, focusing on 
the potential for increased profits and expanded market share, for example through 
increasing the capacity of existing transmission infrastructure with Smart Grid 
components or through constructing new transmission infrastructure that will solve 
congestion limitations on existing infrastructure.  Although industry leaders may be 
nominally interested in doing their part to support national security objectives, they also 
need to address their corporate bottom-line requirement to make a profit.  Tax breaks will 
only lead to increased investment in infrastructure if utilities are able to acquire sufficient 
investment capital.  To obtain the capital, the policy analysis will need to show that there 
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is sufficient room to earn a reasonable return on investment while also improving the 
resiliency of the electric power grid. 
B. ASSESSING POTENTIAL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY 
CHANGES 
It will be a definite challenge to gain congressional and industry support for 
changes to energy policy, especially since only a few years have passed since the most 
recent legislation was enacted and there has not yet been much time to assess the impacts 
of EPAct 2005.  Once an integrated government-industry team has been able to gain 
support for changing energy policy, the next challenge will be to assess the risk of 
unintended consequences that could undermine the intended benefits for electric power 
infrastructure.  As with previous energy legislation that focused on issues such as 
conservation, reducing retail rates, and increasing competition, but resulted in decreased 
infrastructure security, there is a comparable potential that new energy policies focused 
on increasing infrastructure security could cause problems in other aspects of the electric 
power industry.  Some of the potential negative impacts may be worth accepting due to 
the critical importance of ensuring a reliable supply of electricity, but wherever possible, 
it would be better to anticipate and mitigate those risks while the policy changes are 
being developed and implemented. 
One of the most likely potential consequences of investing in new infrastructure is 
a resultant increase in customers’ electricity rates.  A return on investment for 
infrastructure construction is factored into electricity rates to ensure utilities are able to 
attract sufficient investment capital and maintain a reasonable profit margin.  A rate 
increase to pay for capital investments would be offset to some extent by the proposed 
tax breaks established to encourage infrastructure investment.  If a utility’s market share 
is expanded as a result of constructing new infrastructure, any potential increase in rates 
would also be spread over a wider customer base, thus reducing the amount of any 
increase for existing customers.  A number of the investments recommended for 
improving electricity infrastructure security are also targeted toward transmission 
infrastructure, which accounts for only a small percentage of electricity retail rates.  
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Investments in transmission lines and solid state power control devices would impact less 
than 10% of customer’s electricity rates.  In 2006, electricity on average cost 8.9 cents 
per kilowatt-hour and the portion of the rate that covers the cost of transmission 
investment, operations, and maintenance was 0.65 cents per kilowatt-hour, or 7.3% of the 
overall retail rate for electricity.158  While investment in transmission infrastructure can 
have a significant impact on the security of the electric power grid, a resultant increase in 
the retail rate for electricity should be only a small percentage of what consumers pay for 
their electricity.  When looking at a combination of government tax incentives for 
infrastructure investment, an expected increase in utilities’ customer base, and the limited 
impact of transmission infrastructure on electricity retail rates, it leads to the conclusion 
that any small increase in the cost of power should not be a significant impact on 
electricity customers or the overall U.S. economy. 
Another potential consequence of improving the security and reliability of the 
electric power grid is that it may result in an increase in the use of fossil fuels, further 
expanding the dependence on foreign sources of fossil fuels and increasing the 
vulnerability to market price fluctuations.  The use of distributed generation can be 
accomplished with a number of technologies, including, for example, microturbines that 
operate on natural gas or other fuels.  Microturbine designs are efficient and produce 
lower air pollution emissions when compared to a number of older, centralized 
generation facilities.159  Adding additional microturbines and other fossil fuel-powered 
distributed generators will likely increase the nationwide consumption of fossil fuels.  
The issue could be mitigated, though, if the move toward distributed generation was 
combined with incentives to build renewable fuel generation facilities, such as those that 
use solar energy, wind, or biofuels.  In that case, the distributed electricity generation 
would reduce the load on centralized generation facilities and decrease the overall 
national use of fossil fuels.  Both objectives, to increase conservation and improve 
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security with distributed generation, can be accomplished as long as incentives are in 
place to maximize the use of renewable fuel sources. 
Any policy change creates uncertainty in the industry, potentially limiting rather 
than expanding infrastructure investments due to the uncertainty about energy policy 
priorities.  There is always the potential that future Congresses could repeal the policy 
change and revert back to the state before the change took effect or pursue another policy 
objective that becomes a higher priority as a result of changing world events.  The 
potential for continued policy adjustments can never be entirely eliminated, but by 
conducting the policy analysis and implementation planning with an integrated 
government-industry team, the mutually agreed to priorities that are designed to support 
national security objectives should be fairly stable.  Major energy policy changes in the 
past have been made after significant crises, such as drastic increases in oil prices, or 
after many years of efforts to reform the market structure of the energy industry.  The 
recommended emphasis on national security objectives, though, is not driven by a crisis 
or by politically motivated goals.  The emphasis on infrastructure resiliency is designed 
to improve the reliable supply of electricity in order to strengthen all other U.S. critical 
infrastructure sectors.  The focus of the policy changes on security objectives should 
provide a durable support base that will be unlikely to change based on shifting political 
biases or the occurrence of national or international incidents.  Additionally, if the 
legislation that implements the policy change has an extended duration for the incentives 
and a focus on new, efficient technologies, it would be difficult for future Congresses or 
administrations to come up with legitimate rationales to justify overturning the 
legislation.  Even when there have been objections to previous major energy legislation, 
most often the legislation has been adjusted rather than overturned completely.  For 
example, the 1935 PUHCA legislation held for seventy years before it was overturned.  It 
was modified with PURPA and EPAct 1992, but it wasn’t until the effects of those 
legislative changes were assessed, and after many years of debate, that EPAct 2005 
finally eliminated the restrictions in PUHCA and left the oversight of utility holding 
company acquisitions and mergers up to the SEC. 
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There may be other consequences that will occur as a result of focusing energy 
policy on building a resilient electric power infrastructure, but the importance of the 
national security objectives to protect critical infrastructure and protect the foundations of 
U.S. homeland security provides a solid justification for accepting any ancillary effects.  
The modern economy’s dependence on reliable electricity provides a vital reason to 
emphasize resilient power grid architecture.  The U.S. government needs to recognize the 
clear foundational importance of electric power infrastructure and make it a central 
guiding objective in the next major piece of energy policy legislation. 
C. CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT 
Like those who came before us, we must lay the foundations and build the 
institutions that our country needs to meet the challenges we face. The 
[National Security Strategy] will focus on several essential tasks. The 
United States must:…  
• Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges 
and opportunities of the 21st century160 
As we face the dual challenges of preventing terrorist attacks in the 
Homeland and strengthening our Nation’s preparedness for both natural 
and man-made disasters, our most solemn duty is to protect the American 
people. The National Strategy for Homeland Security serves as our guide 
to leverage America’s talents and resources to meet this obligation.161 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security lay the framework that defines the importance of efforts 
to protect U.S. national critical infrastructure.  Within the context of volatile energy 
prices, global financial turmoil, and a continuing battle against terrorism, it is important 
to emphasize the foundational infrastructure that sustains the U.S. economy and the 
ability to carry out national strategic objectives.  The electric power grid is one of the 
most fundamental infrastructures that supports all other critical infrastructure sectors, 
including, among others, information and telecommunications, banking and finance, 
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emergency services, and the defense industrial base.  To sustain the modern U.S. 
economy and support the national security strategy, the recommendations analyzed in this 
paper should be carefully considered, prioritized along with other important national 
objectives, and implemented by Congress in the near future.  The recommendations can 
be readily integrated with other high interest areas that are receiving significant attention, 
such as conservation, environmental protection, and energy independence.  Either in 
entirety or in part, these recommendations will greatly benefit the nation if they are acted 
upon quickly to preserve the security and reliability of national electric power critical 
infrastructure. 
1. Summary of Recommendations 
The following summary captures each of the recommended changes that should 
be considered for energy policy legislation to construct a solidly resilient electric power 
grid. 
a. Regulatory Changes 
- Adequately fund and staff the ERO to train, evaluate, and enforce 
reliability standards; and continue to refine and improve those standards. 
- Mandate technical expertise for a sufficient number of FERC personnel; 
and provide funding for the expert staff needed for rigorous oversight of the electric 
power industry. 
- Extend FERC commissioners terms to provide continuity in regulatory 
policy; and mandate high ethical standards by establishing a waiting period of at least one 
year before commissioners are able to profit from their prior role in FERC. 
- Mandate the designation and approval of needed transmission line siting 
before construction begins on new generation facilities. 
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b. Incentives and Standards 
- Provide long-term financial incentives, including grants, cost sharing, 
and tax breaks for infrastructure investments in transmission lines and distributed 
generation. 
- Establish design standards for grid interconnection, large transformers, 
and other critical infrastructure components. 
- Foster innovative designs such as the Smart Grid, solid state power 
control devices, and grid connection of electric and hybrid vehicle batteries. 
c. Political and Industry Support 
- Establish an integrated government-industry team to focus on improving 
electricity infrastructure resiliency. 
- Conduct a BCA of proposed infrastructure security initiatives to 
demonstrate industry’s ability to achieve national security objectives and make a profit. 
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